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The Merits of Tax Competition in a Globalized Economy
DAVID C. ELKINS*
Since the turn of the current century, leading transnational organizations and
academic scholarship have identified tax competition among countries as one of the
scourges of the international tax regime. Both the EU and the OECD have warned
that tax competition erodes the tax bases of Member States and impedes their ability
to provide essential services. Commentators have argued that unrestrained
competition is driving tax rates on mobile sources of income to (or close to) zero, a
process that jeopardizes the very existence of the welfare state, exacerbates problems
of global poverty, and deprives developing countries of funds that they desperately
need in order to improve their physical infrastructure and human capital. Tax
competition is also said to misallocate economic resources by driving investment to
where the tax rate is lowest rather than to where the return on investment is highest.
Most proposals for reform suggest that, to one extent or another, countries
harmonize their tax policies with the aim of mitigating the threat of mutually harmful
tax competition. One prevalent theme in reform proposals is that countries be
prohibited from offering foreign investors a more lenient tax regime than that which
applies to their own residents (“ring fencing”). The argument is that ring fencing is
a predatory form of tax competition that allows foreign investors to benefit from
government services for which they do not pay, erodes the tax base of other countries,
and, by encouraging other countries to follow suit, instigates a “race to the bottom”
to the detriment of all.
This Article argues that, not only is international tax competition inevitable, but
that free and fair tax competition, far from misallocating resources, is necessary in
order to allocate resources efficiently and to maximize global welfare. It argues that
limiting tax competition, particularly by restricting ring fencing, will likely
exacerbate problems of global poverty and will lead to a more unequal distribution
of wealth. Its thesis, therefore, is that tax reform should encourage, rather than
discourage, international tax competition and that transnational organizations
should focus their efforts on improving the competitive atmosphere.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the turn of the current century, leading transnational organizations and
academic scholarship have identified tax competition among countries as one of the
scourges of the international tax regime.1 Both the European Union (EU) and the

1. According to commentators, tax competition is not the only malady afflicting the
international tax regime. Other oft-cited maladies include the following:
a. Disparate domestic tax rules allow multinational enterprises (MNEs) to engage in tax
arbitrage by arranging their affairs in a manner that eliminates or drastically reduces their
total tax liability. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., ACTION PLAN ON BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 10, 13–19 (2013), available at www.oecd.org
/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3HL-6HHX] [hereinafter OECD, ACTION
PLAN]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 15 (1998), available at www.oecd.org/tax/transparency
/44430243.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK7U-WK2K] [hereinafter OECD, HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION] (referring to “unintentional mismatches between existing tax systems”);
Steven A. Bank, The Globalization of Corporate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1307, 1319
(2013); Ilan Benshalom, How To Redistribute? A Critical Examination of Mechanisms To
Promote Global Wealth Redistribution, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 317, 338 (2014) [hereinafter
Benshalom, How to Redistribute?]; Arthur J. Cockfield, The Limits of the International Tax
Regime as a Commitment Projector, 33 VA. TAX REV. 59, 89–90 (2013); J. Clifton Fleming,
Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Outbound International Tax Reform, 18 CHAP.
L. REV. 133, 138–39 (2014); Marc Morris, United in Diversity, Divided by Sovereignty:
Hybrid Financing, Thin Capitalization, and Tax Coordination in the European Union, 31
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 761, 763 (2014); Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S61, S70–S76 (2002) [hereinafter Roin, Taxation Without Coordination]; H.
David Rosenbloom, Noam Noked & Mohamed S. Helal, The Unruly World of Tax: A
Proposal for an International Tax Cooperation Forum, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 57 (2014); Daniel
Shaviro, Money on the Table?: Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L.
317, 319–21 (2002); Marc D. Shepsman, Comment, Buying FATCA Compliance:
Overcoming Holdout Incentives To Prevent International Tax Arbitrage, 36 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1767, 1769 (2013).
b. Earning-stripping techniques enable MNEs to move earning out of the jurisdiction in which
they operate and into countries that impose no income tax (“tax havens”) or tax income at
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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have warned
that tax competition erodes the tax bases of Member States and impedes their ability
to provide essential services.2 Commentators have argued that unrestrained
competition is driving tax rates on mobile sources of income to (or close to) zero, a
process that jeopardizes the very existence of the welfare state, exacerbates problems
of global poverty, and deprives developing countries of funds that they desperately
need in order to improve their physical infrastructure and human capital. Tax
competition is also said to misallocate economic resources by driving investment to
where the tax rate is lowest rather than to where the return on investment is highest.3

relatively low rates. See Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational
Enterprises by Employing a Hybrid Formulary and Arm’s Length Allocation Method, 28 VA.
TAX REV. 619, 627–28 (2009) [hereinafter Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income];
Jasmine M. Fisher, Note, Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 94 B.U. L. REV. 337, 342–46 (2014); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni
& Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About Cross-Border Earnings Stripping: Establishing
an Analytical Framework, 93 N.C. L. REV. 673, 680–84 (2015); Edward D. Kleinbard,
Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 703 (2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Stateless
Income]; Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 Tax L. Rev. 99, 112
(2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Lessons]; Robert T. Kudrle & Lorraine Eden, The Campaign
Against Tax Havens: Will It Last? Will It Work?, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 37, 37–42 (2003);
Henry Ordower, Utopian Visions Toward a Grand Unified Global Income Tax, 14 FLA. TAX
REV. 361, 363 (2003); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 923, 936–42 (2010) [hereinafter Rosenzweig, Tax Havens?].
c. Lack of effective exchange of information facilitates illegal tax evasion. OECD, HARMFUL
TAX COMPETITION, supra at 29–30; see Council, Conclusions of the Ecofin Council Meeting
on 1 December 1997 Concerning Taxation Policy, 1998 O.J. (C 2/01) 1, 6 [hereinafter
Conclusions of the Ecofin Council Meeting], available at http://ec.europa.eu
/taxation_customs/resources/documents/coc_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBQ9-DL77]; Allison
Christians, Getting to Yes? Thoughts on a BATNA for International Tax, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
ONLINE 7; Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 605 (2008); Miguel González Marcos, Seclusion in (Fiscal) Paradise Is Not an Option:
The OECD Harmful Tax Practices Initiative and Offshore Financial Centers, 24 N.Y. INT’L
L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2011); Chad P. Ralston, Comment, Going It Alone: A Pragmatic Approach
to Combating Foreign-Effected Tax Evasion, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 873, 894–96 (2010);
Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition,
89 GEO. L.J. 543, 595–96 (2001) [hereinafter Roin, Competition and Evasion]; Rosenbloom
et al., supra; Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012 WIS. L. REV.
717 [hereinafter Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty].
The focus of the current Article is tax competition and, except in passing, it will not discuss
these other issues. Furthermore, it is arguable that tax competition is the most fundamental
issue facing the international tax regime. If indeed disharmony, earnings stripping, and lack of
information are negative phenomena, it may be that tax competition both creates the necessary
framework within which they can operate (e.g., by encouraging countries to lower their tax
rates and inviting taxpayers to strip earnings out of higher-tax countries) and prevents their
resolution (e.g., by inhibiting efforts toward harmonization and information exchange).
2. Conclusions of the Ecofin Council Meeting, supra note 1, at 6; OECD, ACTION PLAN,
supra note 1, at 17; OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 14.
3. See sources cited infra note 71.
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The current state of affairs has often been described as a prisoners’ dilemma, a
situation in which each participant rationally employing its own optimal strategy
produces a less-than-optimal result. In the game of international tax competition, the
participants are countries. Each would like to maintain a relatively high rate of tax,
but cannot afford to do so for fear of losing international investment to countries that
offer lower tax rates. Consequently, they all lower their tax rates and each ends up
with less funds to spend on public projects.4
As countering a prisoners’ dilemma requires that the participants coordinate
their behavior instead of acting independently, most proposals for reform suggest
that—to one extent or another—countries harmonize their tax policies with the aim
of mitigating the threat of mutually harmful tax competition. One prevalent theme in
reform proposals is that countries be prohibited from offering foreign investors a
more lenient tax regime than that which applies to their own residents (“ring
fencing”).5 The argument is that ring fencing is a predatory form of tax competition

4. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 34 (“[Countries] collectively
would be better off by not offering incentives but each feels compelled to offer the incentive
to maintain a competitive business environment.”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Comment on
Peroni, Fleming, and Shay, “Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on
Foreign Source Income,” 52 SMU L. REV. 531, 539 (1999); Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States
from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110
HARV. L. REV. 377, 396 (1996) (describing a similar phenomenon on the state level);
Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, supra note 1, at 731–33. In the classic
prisoners’ dilemma, each of two prisoners is under suspicion of armed robbery, a felony that
carries a sentence of ten years in prison. Without a confession or the testimony of one prisoner
against the other, the district attorney can prove only illegal possession of a weapon, a
misdemeanor that carries a sentence of one year. The district attorney approaches each of the
prisoners separately with an offer to cooperate, that is, to confess and to be willing to testify
against the other. The terms of the offer: if both cooperate, each will receive a sentence of five
years; if only one cooperates, that prisoner will receive a suspended sentence and the other
will receive a ten-year sentence. Assuming that neither prisoner is concerned with the other’s
welfare and that, even if they can communicate, they do not trust each other to abide by any
agreement they might make, not cooperating is not an effective option for either of them.
Depending upon what the other does, cooperating will result in either a suspended sentence or
a five-year sentence, while refusing to cooperate will result in a one-year or a ten-year sentence
(the number in parentheses are A’s prison time followed by B’s prison time):

B does not cooperate
B cooperates

A does not cooperate

A cooperates

(1, 1)
(10, 0)

(0, 10)
(5, 5)

Despite the fact that by not cooperating the prisoners could have could have gotten away with
one-year sentences, by rationally pursuing their own best interests each will receive a five-year
sentence.
5. See, e.g., Conclusions of the Ecofin Council Meeting, supra note 1, at 3 (Code of
conduct for business taxation); OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 26–28;
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Bridging the North/South Divide: International Redistribution and Tax
Competition, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 371, 384 (2004); Hedda Leikvang, Note, Piercing the Veil
of Secrecy: Securing Effective Exchange of Information to Remedy the Harmful Effects of Tax
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that allows foreign investors to benefit from government services for which they do
not pay, erodes the tax base of other countries, and, by encouraging other countries
to follow suit, instigates a “race to the bottom” to the detriment of all.
This Article will argue that, not only is international tax competition inevitable,
but that free and fair tax competition, far from misallocating resources, is necessary
in order to allocate resources efficiently and to maximize global welfare. It will argue
that limiting tax competition, particularly by restricting ring fencing, will likely
exacerbate problems of global poverty and will lead to a more unequal distribution
of wealth. Its thesis, therefore, is that tax reform should encourage, rather than
discourage, international tax competition and that transnational organizations should
focus their efforts on improving the competitive atmosphere.
The Current International Tax Regime
The international tax regime, as it evolved in the early decades of the twentieth
century, rested upon three primary pillars.6 The first is that a country is entitled to
tax all income derived from sources within its territory.7 The second is that a country
is entitled to tax the worldwide income of its residents.8 The third is that it is the

Havens, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 293, 299 (2012); Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition,
Foreign Direct Investments and Growth: Using the Tax System To Promote Developing
Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161, 189 (2003); Ruth Mason, U.S. Tax Treaty Policy and the
European Court of Justice, 59 TAX L. REV. 65, 101 (2005).
6. For a discussion of whether the current international tax regime has acquired the status
of international law, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57
TAX L. REV. 483 (2004); Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International
Income, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 145, 148 n.23 (1998); H. David Rosenbloom,
International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax System,” 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 166
(2000).
7. Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 490 (“The right of countries to tax income arising in their
territory is well established in international law.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(a) (1987).
8. Not all countries exercise their full rights under international usage to tax the
worldwide income of their residents. For example, Germany, France, and the Netherlands
impose tax only on domestic source income, without regard to the residence of the taxpayer.
Yoram Keinan, The Case for Residency-Based Taxation of Financial Transactions in
Developing Countries, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 12 (2008). On the other end of the spectrum, the
United States has stretched the ambit of those subject to tax on their worldwide income beyond
that of any other country to include not only resident individuals and domestic corporations
but also nonresident citizens. § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, which defines gross income
as “all income from whatever source derived,” is not qualified with regard to the identity of
the taxpayer or the geographical source of the income. I.R.C. § 61 (2012). § 871 stipulates
that, in the case of nonresident aliens, gross income includes only U.S.-source income (or
income “effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United
States”). Id. at § 871. § 882(b) contains a similar provision with regard to foreign corporations.
Id. at § 882(b). As neither of these sections applies to nonresident citizens, they are subject to
the §61 default rule. (No country other than the United States taxes according to citizenship).
See JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 9–10 (3d ed. 2010); Avi-Yonah, supra note
6, at 487. For discussion of the appropriateness of taxing nonresident citizens, see generally
Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad: Reconciling Principle
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responsibility of the home country to alleviate or mitigate double taxation.9 The 1923
report by a committee of four leading economists to the League of Nations,10 a report
which, although not adopted in its entirety, was largely responsible for the contours
of the current international tax regime,11 relied upon the concept of economic
allegiance to grant taxing power to both the host country and the home country.12
However, by the second half of the century, the literature had abandoned the
somewhat nebulous notion of economic allegiance and instead tended to justify the
international tax regime in terms of equity and neutrality. Home country taxation of
worldwide income was said to accord with the principles of both horizontal and
vertical equity: both of these concepts require a determination of ability to pay,13 and

and Practice, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 117 (2014); Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global
Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (2007); Bernard Schneider, The End of Taxation Without
End: A New Tax Regime for U.S. Expatriates, 32 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2012); Edward A. Zelinsky,
Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96
IOWA L. REV. 1289 (2011); Daniel Shaviro, Taxing Potential Community Members’ Foreign
Source Income, (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 15-09, 2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625732 [https://perma.cc
/Q9AN-NB8Y].
9. To fulfill its obligations under the third pillar, the United States grants its taxpayers a
credit for foreign taxes paid in respect of foreign-source income. I.R.C. § 901(a); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 23 (2016),
available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty
-US%20Model-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5C6-VB5J]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND
DEV. COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL,
art. 23A–B, available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation
/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-2014-full-version/article-23-a-and-23-b
-exemption-method-and-credit-method_9789264239081-26-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/3S3M
-KP3W] (containing alternative methods for elimination of double taxation: the “Exemption
Method” in Article 23A and the “Credit Method” in Article 23B).
10. ECON. & FIN. COMM’N, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, REPORT ON DOUBLE TAXATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEE BY PROFESSORS BRUINS, EINAUDI, SELIGMAN AND
SIR JOSIAH STAMP (1923), reprinted in 4 JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 4003 (1962).
11. After approving the imposition of tax by both the country in which the wealth
originated and the country of residence or domicile, infra note 12, the Commission considered
the foreign tax credit—which it referred to as “the method of deduction for income from
abroad”—as a means of mitigating double taxation but rejected it as impractical. ECON. & FIN.
COMM’N, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 10, at 4046 (emphasis removed) (“It is to be
doubted whether such creditor countries as the United States, Great Britain and the
Netherlands, having regard to their interests abroad, would ever agree permanently to put their
exchequers at the mercy of all the unknown increases of taxation of foreign Governments.”).
12. The report listed four elements of economic allegiance: “the acquisition of wealth, the
location of wealth, the enforceability of the rights to wealth, and the consumption of wealth.”
ECON. & FIN. COMM’N, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 10, at 4027. It went on to state that
“the most important factors . . . are . . . the origin of the wealth and the residence or domicile
of the owner who consumes the wealth.” Id. at 4029.
13. David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 43, 88 (2006).
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ability to pay is a function of one’s worldwide income.14 Home country taxation of
worldwide income was also said to prevent tax considerations from influencing a
firm’s decision in which country to operate (“capital export neutrality” or CEN).15
Host country taxation was said to permit all firms operating in a given market to
compete on equal footing (“capital import neutrality” or CIN).16
Whatever its theoretical justification, this regime proved workable in an era in
which consumer goods and the means of their production were largely tangible and
in which formidable legal and practical barriers inhibited the free movement of
capital and goods. Competition among countries for investment was limited. As late
as the late 1980s, corporate income tax rates of 60% or higher were not uncommon.17
The Challenge of Globalization
Toward the end of the twentieth century, circumstances began to change
dramatically. A political resolve to integrate various nations’ economies as a bulwark
against future military conflict and the growing understanding that international trade
is mutually beneficial, and not a zero-sum game, resulted in the lowering of legal
barriers to the movement of capital and goods.18 Technological advances in the fields

14. For example, all else being equal, a U.S. resident with $100,000 of U.S.-source
income and $900,000 of foreign-source income has the same ability to pay as does a U.S.
resident with $1,000,000 of U.S.-source income and no foreign-income (horizontal equity)
and a much greater ability to pay than does a U.S. resident with $100,000 of U.S.-source
income and no foreign-source income (vertical equity). See e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert
J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-To-Pay Case for
Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 311–313 (2001); Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax
Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1761 n.27
(1995).
15. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S.
International Taxation, 25 VA. TAX REV. 313, 324–27 (2005).
16. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1605–06 (2000). Other, more recent, concepts of
neutrality include capital ownership neutrality (CON), national ownership neutrality (NON),
national neutrality (NN), and global portfolio neutrality (GPN). See generally CHARLES H.
GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS 20–22 (4th ed. 2011); James R. Hines, Jr., Reconsidering the Taxation of
Foreign Income, 62 TAX L. REV. 269, 273–79 (2009); Report of the Task Force on
International Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAW. 649, 680–89 (2006). For a critical view of what he
refers to as “alphabet soup” and “the battle of the acronyms,” see DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 14 (2014). See also Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and
Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1540, 1574–78 (2009) (introducing labor export
neutrality (LEN), labor import neutrality (LIN), labor ownership neutrality (LON), and labor
residence neutrality (LRN)).
17. Finland had a corporate tax rate of 61.8% in 1985, Sweden has a corporate tax rate of
60.1% in 1989, and West Germany has a corporate tax rate of 60% until 1989. OECD
Corporate Tax Income Rates, 1981–2013, TAX FOUNDATION (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://taxfoundation.org/article/oecd-corporate-income-tax-rates-1981-2013 [https://perma.cc
/T2MU-27GJ].
18. See CHRISTOPHER M. DENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY: THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 189
(1997); WILLEM MOLLE, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 41–44 (5th ed. 2006).
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of communication and transportation removed many of the practical barriers. As
markets opened, competition for investment—and particularly for MNE
investment—increased.19 The result was a drastic lowering of corporate tax rates,
including the temporary or permanent waiver of taxation altogether (“tax
holidays”).20
Nor has tax competition been limited to exotic island states, developing countries,
or renegade nations. The average corporate income tax rate in OECD countries fell
from a high of 48.2% in 1985 to a low of 25.4% in 2012.21 In several instances, the
reduction was much more dramatic. Sweden slashed its corporate tax rate by more
than half in a period of just two years, from 60.1% in 1989 to 30% in 1991.22 In
Norway, the corporate tax rate dropped from 50.8% in 1991 to 28% in 1992.23 Ireland
has been particularly aggressive in this regard, introducing a 10% corporate tax rate
on manufacturing income (1981) and a 12.5% corporate tax rate on trading income
(2003).24 The United States, while retaining a relatively high statutory corporate tax
rate,25 lowered tax rates to zero on various types of passive income in order to
encourage foreign investment. In 1984, it abolished its withholding tax on portfolio
interest, effectively exempting foreign corporations and nonresident aliens from tax
on such income.26 Every other major capital-importing country has since followed
suit.27 In 1987, the United States exempted foreign corporations and nonresident
aliens from tax on capital gain from the sale of personal property.28 Since 2000, China
and a number of European countries have adopted “Patent Box” or “IP Box” regimes,
under which income attributable to patents is subject to tax at exceptionally low

19. Ming-Sung Kuo, (Dis)embodiments of Constitutional Authorship: Global Tax
Competition and the Crisis of Constitutional Democracy, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 181,
186 (2009) (“Tax competition exists in its current state because of the high mobility of capital
in the global era.”); Rosenzweig, Tax Havens?, supra note 1, at 943. But see Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, And Yet It Moves: Taxation and Labor Mobility in the Twenty-First Century, 67
TAX L. REV. 169, 170 (2014) (arguing that for upper-middle and high income taxpayers,
expatriation is not significantly more difficult than moving capital abroad).
20. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1577, 1588–92; Kuo, supra note 19, at 189.
21. OECD Corporate Tax Income Rates, 1981–2013, supra note 17.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. AIDAN WALSH & CHRIS SANGER, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF THE IRISH CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM: A REPORT COMMISSIONED
BY THE IRISH DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE 5 (2015), available at http://www.budget.gov.ie
/Budgets/2015/Documents/EY_Historical_Dev_International_Context_Irish_%20Corporation
_Tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7NG-7A6Q].
25. § 11 imposes a top rate of 35%. I.R.C. § 11 (2012). This rate is second only to Japan
among OECD countries. OECD Corporate Tax Income Rates, 1981–2013, supra note 17.
26. I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (2012).
27. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1576, 1581–83; Keinan, supra note 8, at 29; Kuo, supra
note 19, at 187.
28. I.R.C. § 865 (2012).
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rates.29 In September 2014, the House of Representatives passed legislation that
would institute a Patent Box regime in the United States.30
This ongoing and multifaceted process has created what some have described as
a crisis in the international tax regime.31 Highly profitable corporations often pay
little or no income tax.32 Some studies indicate that labor now bears a substantially
higher percentage of the tax burden than it did previously.33 Moreover, many analysts
have argued that, by skewing MNE investment decisions, tax competition
misallocates resources and reduces global welfare.34
Responding to these challenges, the EU and the OECD have proposed a number
of measures to combat what they term “harmful tax competition.” In 1997, the EU’s
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (“ECOFIN”), following a “wide-ranging
debate,”35 adopted a Code of Conduct for Member States in the field of business
taxation.36 The focus of the Code was on “tax measures which provide for a
significantly lower effective level of taxation, including zero taxation, than those
levels which generally apply in the Member State,”37 a phenomenon it referred to as
“ring-fenc[ing].”38 The Code committed Member States to refrain from introducing
such harmful measures and, furthermore, to examine their existing law and practices
“with a view to eliminating any harmful measures as soon as possible.”39
In 1998, the OECD published a report entitled Harmful Tax Competition: An
Emerging Global Issue,40 which targeted both “tax havens”41 and “harmful

29. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: UNITED
KINGDOM 33–35 (2013); Lisa Evers, Helen Miller & Christoph Spengel, Intellectual Property
Box Regimes: Effective Tax Rates and Tax Policy Considerations, 22 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN.
502, 505 (2015), available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10797-014-9328-x
[https://perma.cc/CPH3-VYBS]; Rachel Griffith, Helen Miller & Martin O’Connell,
Ownership of Intellectual Property and Corporate Taxation, 112 J. PUB. ECON. 12, 20–21
(2014), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272714000103
[https://perma.cc/T96Q-4ADZ]; Wolfgang Kessler & Rolf Eicke, The Emergence of R&D
Tax Regimes in Europe, 50 TAX NOTES INT’L 845 (2008); Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax
Base Erosion: Reformation of Section 482’s Arm’s Length Standard, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 737,
740–41 (2014).
30. Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act of 2014, H.R. 2996, 113th
Cong. (2014), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/2996
[https://perma.cc/474U-FGS6].
31. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1599–1603.
32. Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 57 (2014); Zachary R. Mider,
Ten Percent of S&P 500 Companies Avoid Paying U.S. Taxes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Apr.
14, 2015, 11:11 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-14/how-10-percent
-of-s-p-companies-opted-out-of-paying-u-s-taxes [https://perma.cc/5X84-CFSW].
33. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1618–25.
34. See infra Part I.E.
35. Conclusions of the Ecofin Council Meeting, supra note 1, at 1.
36. Id. at 2–5.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 4.
40. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 1.
41. Id. at 21–25. According to the report, the identifying characteristics of tax havens are
no or only nominal taxation, lack of effective exchange of information, lack of transparency
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preferential tax regimes.”42 As to the identification of harmful preferential tax
regimes, the OECD report, like the EU’s Code of Conduct, emphasized ring
fencing.43 In 2013, the OECD followed up with an Action Plan on Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (“Action Plan”).44 The Action Plan noted that “[t]he underlying policy
concerns expressed in the 1998 Report as regards the ‘race to the bottom’ on the
mobile income tax base are as relevant today as they were 15 years ago” and directed
the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) “to develop more effective solutions.”45
The academic community has largely supported international efforts to combat
tax competition.46 Proponents of restricting competition argue that doing so will
increase global welfare and lead to a fairer distribution of wealth. One theme
prevalent in the literature is that while democratic countries have the sovereign right
to determine the size of their government and the level of tax they wish to impose,
lenient tax regimes applicable only to foreigners are abusive and should be curtailed.

in the operation of legislative, legal, or administrative provision, and the absence of a
requirement for substantial economic activity. Id. at 23.
42. Id. at 25–35.
43. Id. at 26–28. The other “key factors” in identifying harmful preferential tax regime
are similar to the listed characteristics of tax havens: no or low effective tax rates, lack of
transparency, and lack of effective exchange of information. Id at 27. “Other factors” include
an artificial definition of the tax base, failure to adhere to international transfer pricing
principles, exemption of foreign source income from residence country tax, negotiability of
tax rate or tax base, existence of secrecy provisions, access to a wide network of tax treaties,
promotion of regimes as tax minimization vehicles, and encouragement of purely tax-driven
operations or arrangements. Id. at 30–34.
44. OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 1. Between 2000 and 2006, the OECD published
four updates detailing implementation of its report on Harmful Tax Competition: ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2000
MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL
AFFAIRS: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES (2000),
available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/harmful/2090192.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8QM-VA4V];
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE OECD'S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX
PRACTICES: THE 2001 PROGRESS REPORT (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org
/ctp/harmful/2664450.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VZW-QKSA]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
AND DEV., THE OECD'S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2004 PROGRESS REPORT
(2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/30901115.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6D9
-A8N3]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX
PRACTICES: 2006 UPDATE ON MEMBER COUNTRIES, available at http://www.oecd.org
/tax/harmful/37446434.pdf [https://perma.cc/87K9-JK3J].
45. OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 17.
46. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 16; Avi-Yonah, supra note 5; Benshalom, How to
Redistribute?, supra note 1, at 356; Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income, supra note 1;
Brauner, supra note 32, at 61; Christians, supra note 1; Fleming & Peroni, supra note 1; J.
Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Formulary Apportionment in the
U.S. International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1
(2014); Keinan, supra note 8; Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 1; Kleinbard, Lessons,
supra note 1; Shepsman, supra note 1. Some commentators are more sympathetic to tax
competition: E.g., Margalioth, supra note 5; Jeffery Owens, Tax Competition: To Welcome or
Not? 65 TAX L. REV. 173 (2012); Roin, Competition and Evasion, supra note 1. See also infra
note 171 and sources cited.
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In other words, a country may legitimately adopt whatever tax rate it deems
appropriate; may impose different tax rates on different types of income; and may
even refrain from taxing certain types of income, but once it does so, it must apply
those rates across the board to residents and nonresidents alike.47 Discrimination in
favor of foreigners, or ring fencing, is indicative of an attempt to profit at the expense
of another country’s treasury.48 Furthermore, it is argued, ring fencing is ineffective
as it merely invites other countries to follow suit, resulting in a race to the bottom in
which all countries lose.
Overview
The thesis of this Article is that attempts to reform the international tax regime by
restricting tax competition are misguided and would likely be counterproductive. Not
only is tax competition a precondition for an efficient allocation of global resources,
but restrictions on tax competition and, in particular, restrictions on ring fencing will
likely exacerbate, not mitigate, inequality in the distribution of wealth. Rather than
attempting to restrict tax competition, transnational organizations and commentators
should encourage competition and focus their attention on removing obstacles to free
competition among host countries for MNE investment and among MNEs for
investment opportunities.
The focus of the current Article is competition for foreign investment. It will not
discuss the exploitation of tax havens or of disharmony among the various countries’
tax regimes to lower taxable income in an artificial manner,49 nor, except in passing,
the principles that should apply to the taxation of a country’s own citizens and
residents, whether derived from sources within the country or abroad.
Building on the work of Friedrich Hayek, Part I explains why, in practice, tax
competition is necessary in order to achieve an efficient distribution of global
resources. It describes how, under a regime of tax competition, the taxes demanded
by host countries, the incentives that they offer, and the investment decisions of
MNEs convey essential information regarding the availability of resources,
consumer preferences, and the expected impact of investments on the residents of
host countries and induce behavior that is conducive to the maximization of global
wealth. It then suggests some measures that the international community might

47. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 15 (“The Committee
recognises that there are no particular reasons why any two countries should have the same
level and structure of taxation. Although differences in tax levels and structures may have
implications for other countries, these are essentially political decisions for national
governments.”).
48. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 384 (“The OECD makes a useful distinction
between tax competition in the form of generally applicable lower tax rates, and tax regimes
designed to attract foreign investors. This distinction is both normatively and pragmatically
sound: restricting tax competition should not and cannot mean that voters in democratic
countries lose their right to determine the size of the public sector through general tax increases
or reductions. Rather, it means that countries should not provide windfalls for foreign investors
. . . .”); Javier G. Salinas, The OECD Tax Competition Initiative: A Critique of Its Merits in
the Global Marketplace, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 531, 541 (2003).
49. See supra note 1.

916

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:905

undertake in order to neutralize sources of market failure and thereby create a more
effective competitive environment.
Part II considers the claim that tax competition violates transactional justice by
making it difficult for host countries, which provide services to MNEs operating in
their territory, to receive just compensation for those services. It argues that, via
factor prices, MNEs indirectly pay for many of the services that they receive from
the government of the host country. Charging them directly would constitute double
charging for the same services. With regard to those benefits that are not reflected in
factor prices, tax competition will not prevent host countries from receiving full
compensation through direct taxation of the MNE.
Part III considers the argument that while a regime of tax competition may be
efficient, the consequent “race to the bottom” violates distributive justice by
impeding the ability of countries to provide social services and by obstructing the
redistribution of resources from wealthy countries to poorer ones. With regard to
domestic distributive justice, this Part argues that foreign investors have no
obligation to finance the social assistance or the social insurance programs of the
host country, beyond paying full market price for the services from which they
benefit. It further argues that the prohibition against ring fencing, which lies at the
heart of most proposals to restrict tax competition, is likely to exacerbate economic
inequality by penalizing those countries that attempt to redistribute wealth or to
provide extensive social services. With regard to alleviating international poverty, it
posits that the international tax system is both an ineffective and an inefficient means
of redistributing wealth.
The Article’s final paragraphs summarize the arguments and offer some
concluding thoughts.
I. TAX COMPETITION
A. Efficient Allocation of Resources Through Price Signaling
In an important article published in 1945,50 Friedrich Hayek argued that a
centrally planned economy is incapable of optimally distributing resources for the
simple reason that no central planning board could possibly have access to all of the
relevant information, (i.e., the availability of every resource and every individual’s
preference regarding the use of those resources).51 Furthermore, the data are in
constant flux, so that even if a central planning board could somehow ascertain the
pertinent facts at a given instant, the information would soon become obsolete. 52

50. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
51. Id., at 519–20, 530; see also F.A. Hayek, Two Pages of Fiction: The Impossibility of
Socialist Calculation, 2 ECON. AFF. 135, 137 (1982) (calling the claim that administrators of
a socialist could have exactly the same knowledge of production functions as do capitalist
entrepreneurs “a blatant untruth, an assertion so absurd that it is difficult to understand how
an intelligent person could ever honestly make it.”).
52. Hayek, supra note 50, at 525–27; Hayek, supra note 51, at 137. Hayek also noted that
even if one mind could possess all of the relevant information, the calculations necessary to
determine the optimal distribution are beyond human capacity, as they involve the
simultaneous solution of innumerable equations. Hayek, supra note 50, at 525; Hayek, supra
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As the data are widely disbursed, an efficient allocation of resources requires a
decentralization of the decision-making process. However, because no one person
could be aware of more than an infinitesimally small portion of the relevant
information, effective decision making depends upon speedy communication of
information regarding resource availability and consumer preferences and,
moreover, a means to induce individuals to adapt their behavior to the incoming
data.53
Hayek’s insight was that the medium via which the market disseminates such
information and induces such change in behavior is price. Assume, he argued, that
somewhere in the world a new use has been discovered for a certain raw material or,
alternatively, that an existent source of supply has been curtailed. Consumers of the
material will instantly become aware of the possibility of it being more profitably
employed elsewhere and will curtail their use of it. In Hayek’s words, “without an
order being issued, without more than perhaps a handful of people knowing the
cause, tens of thousands of people whose identity could not be ascertained by months
of investigation, are made to use the material or its products more sparingly.”54
As prices are the signals employed by the market to convey information, they
need to be free to respond to changing circumstances. Not permitting prices to
fluctuate freely impairs the capacity of the price system to direct resources to their
most efficient uses (although, as Hayek noted, when prices are fixed, communication
often will continue through other elements of the contract).55
Seventy years after their publication, Hayek’s words are as relevant as ever. The
appearance in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries of a globalized
economy, a state of affairs in which the phrase “global welfare” takes on practical
significance, has turned the tens of thousands of people, to whom Hayek referred,
into billions. As the world becomes more and more economically integrated and as
the use (or misuse) of resources anywhere has a greater and more immediate impact
on the welfare of people everywhere, disseminating information regarding local
conditions and correlating information from different locales has become more and
more crucial. As Hayek so convincingly explained, the best and perhaps the only
way to do so is by individual actors responding to the signals conveyed via the price
system and altering their behavior accordingly.
B. Host Country Tax and Incentive Policy
Individuals and firms are not the only actors in the global economy. Governments
also play a crucial role by representing the interests of their citizens and residents on
the world stage and by setting the terms and conditions under which economic
activity takes place within their territories. In this Part, we will focus on taxes that
governments impose on MNEs engaged in local economic activity, on incentives that
governments offer MNEs as an inducement to engage in local economic activity, and
on the signals conveyed by these taxes and incentives.

note 51, at 139.
53. Hayek, supra note 50, at 524–25.
54. Id. at 527.
55. Id. at 526.
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From the perspective of the host country, MNE investment entails both costs and
benefits. The most obvious costs are those that involve direct economic outlay such
as expanding the transportation infrastructure (or experiencing increased traffic and
increased wear and tear on existing roads) and providing additional law enforcement,
health, and possibly educational services (if, for example, foreigners bring their
children to their new place of employment). Foreign investment could impose
environmental costs such as increased pollution or damage to the local ecosystem.
Costs could also include what the host country considers a threat to local culture,
such as the displacement of traditional artisans or the importation of foreign values.
The benefits inherent in MNE investment are similarly many and varied. Perhaps
the most obvious is increased employment as MNEs hire local workers and contract
with local firms who hire local workers. The beneficiaries of such employment
include not only the employees themselves, but also the government, both because it
may be relieved of some of the expenses of its social safety net and because it may
be able to tax employees’ salaries. Increased employment also tends to stimulate
further economic activity as employees use their salaries to purchase consumer goods
and services from local firms. The importation of technology and other intangibles,
exposure to the global economy, and establishment of international contacts could
increase the capital base of the host country and assist the country in developing its
own industry.56
The difference between anticipated total costs and anticipated total benefits is,
from the perspective of the host country, the ex ante “net cost” or “net benefit” of the
investment (for reasons that will soon become clear, the terms “benefits” and “costs”
do not include taxes imposed by the host country on the MNE or grants or subsidies
provided by the host country). In any case, it is crucial to note that whether an
anticipated effect of foreign investment constitutes a cost or a benefit and the
quantification of the cost or the benefit is a subjective determination of the host
country. What one country views as a cost another may consider a benefit. What one
country regards as a minor nuisance another will judge a catastrophe.
As a sovereign entity, a country is permitted under customary international law to
impose tax on foreigners who engage in economic activity within its territory.57 It
may also offer MNEs incentives in the form of direct grants or subsidies. In some
instances, it may do both. In any case, we can describe the difference between the
anticipated cost of providing the incentives and the anticipated tax revenue as a “net
incentive” or a “net tax.” Note that the anticipated tax revenue is what the host
country estimates it will collect directly from the MNE. Additional tax revenue that
it expects to collect as an indirect result of the investment, for example, by taxing the
salaries of those employed by the MNE, was included as one of the potential benefits
of the investment.
A country for which the anticipated costs of a particular MNE investment
outweigh the anticipated benefits would rationally be willing to sanction the
investment if and only if the net tax that it anticipates collecting from the MNE is
greater than the net cost of hosting the investment.58 A country for which the

56. Margalioth, supra note 5, at 176–80.
57. See sources cited supra note 7.
58. When the anticipated tax exactly equals the anticipated net cost, the country will be
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anticipated benefits of a particular MNE investment outweigh the anticipated costs
would rationally be willing not only to exempt the MNE from paying tax but also to
provide net incentives. From the perspective of the host country, the investment has
positive value as long as the cost of providing the net incentives is less than the net
benefit of hosting the investment.59
Mathematically, there is no substantive distinction between net cost and net
benefit. Each describes a set of points along a continuum: net benefit is simply
negative net cost (or net cost is simply negative net benefit). On a line extending to
infinite negative net cost on the left and to infinite positive net cost on the right, any
point to the left of zero we can term either a net benefit or a negative net cost and any
point to the right of zero we can term either a net cost or a negative net benefit:

Negative net cost
(positive net benefit)

Zero

Positive net cost
(negative net benefit)

Figure 1. Net cost and net benefit

Similarly, there is no substantive distinction between net taxes and net incentives.
On a line extending to infinite negative net tax on the left and to infinite positive net
tax on the right, any point to the left of zero we can term either a net incentive or a
negative net tax and any point to the right of zero we can term either a net tax or a
negative net incentive:

Negative net tax
(positive net incentive)

Zero

Positive net tax
(negative net incentive)

Figure 2. Net tax and net incentive

Describing net benefit and net incentive as, respectively, negative net cost and
negative net tax permits the analysis to flow more freely and emphasizes the fact that
there is no particular significance to the point marked “zero” on each of the above
lines. Zero does not represent a singularity, but rather one of an infinite number of
points along a smooth continuum.60 We can now state in simple terms two important
propositions:

indifferent to the investment.
59. If the inducement is equal to the net benefit, then the investment has zero (i.e., neither
negative nor positive) value for the host country.
60. The literature seems to attach significance to the point of zero tax. See Steven A.
Dean, More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the
International Tax Regime, 84 TUL. L. REV. 125, 153 (2009); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M.
Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion
Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333, 339–41 (1988); Roin, Competition and Evasion, supra
note 1, at 553–54; Rosenzweig, Tax Havens?, supra note 1, at 942.
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a.

A rational country will welcome investment by an MNE if and only if the net
tax that it anticipates collecting from the MNE is greater than the net cost of
hosting the investment.

b.

By presenting to MNEs a regime of taxes and incentives, the country signals
that, from its perspective, the anticipated net tax exceeds the anticipated net
cost. (Because “net tax” and “net cost” can each represent negative values,
this proposition also means that, when a country offers incentives that exceed
the amount of the anticipated tax revenue, it signals that the anticipated net
benefits exceed the anticipated net incentives.)

Proposition (b) is critical. In Hayekian terms, the taxes and incentives that a
country offers to MNEs constitute a means of conveying information regarding local
resources and local preferences to those for whom such information might be
relevant and of inducing them to change their behavior accordingly. The target of
such information is not only the MNEs themselves, but also—and more
importantly—the consumers or ultimate consumers of products produced by the
MNE.
C. MNE Choice of Investment Venue
When deciding whether to invest in a given country, an MNE considers the
benefits and the costs of doing so. Costs include both actual outlays and opportunity
costs, that is, the profit that the MNE could have earned with the best alternative
investment. The benefits that the MNE expects the investment to generate ultimately
reflect consumer preferences. Consistent with the methodology we implemented in
analyzing the investment from the perspective of the host country, cost and benefit
do not include taxes payable to the host country or incentives that the MNE might
receive from the host country.61
If benefits are greater than costs, the difference is the net advantage, from the
perspective of the MNE, of its operating in the country. If costs are greater than
benefits, the difference is, again from the perspective of the MNE, the net
disadvantage. Here, too, the difference is quantitative and not qualitative. Net
advantage, zero advantage, and net disadvantage constitute a continuum:

Negative net advantage
(net disadvantage)
Figure 3. Net advantage

61. See supra Part I.B.

Zero

Net advantage
(negative net disadvantage)
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We can now state the following two propositions which describe MNE behavior
and the signals it sends:
c.

An MNE will be willing to invest in a country if and only if the net advantage
is less than the expected net tax.

d.

By investing in a country, the MNE signals that the anticipated net
advantage exceeds the net tax it expects to pay. (Because “net advantage”
and “net tax” can each represent negative values, this proposition also
means that, when an MNE receives incentives to invest in a country, it
signals that the anticipated net incentives exceed the anticipated net
disadvantage.)

Here, proposition (d) is critical. In Hayekian terms, decisions that MNEs make
with regard to the location of their investments constitute a means of conveying
information regarding consumer preferences.
D. Tax Signaling and Efficiency
In a competitive market, the signals sent by potential host countries and those sent
by MNEs will intersect and will produce a pattern of investment that will maximize
global welfare.62 To demonstrate, let us begin with a relatively simple example.63
Assume that MNE1 has decided to construct a manufacturing plant and is
considering three countries as potential venues:
Country A is an underdeveloped country. Were it to invest in Country A, MNE1
would incur large expenses in preparing the necessary physical infrastructure,
training employees, and so forth. MNE1 estimates that its profit from the
investment would be about 40 (all numbers are stated in terms of present value).
From its perspective, Country A would benefit greatly from the spillover effects of
such an investment. It estimates the value of the spillover effect as about 80. In
other words, were it not only to exempt MNE1 from any tax but also provide it
with incentives equal to 80, the investment would neither raise nor lower the
welfare of its residents. We can describe net tax of negative 80 as Country A’s
“indifference point.”
Country B is an emerging economy with a moderately well-developed
infrastructure. MNE1 estimates its profit from investing in Country B to be 140.
Country B would benefit from the investment and its indifference point is net tax of

62. But see Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 398 (1996) (“[T]he
net effect of the incentive competition is . . . far worse than zero-sum.”); Tracy A. Kaye, The
Gentle Art of Corporate Seduction: Tax Incentives in the United States and the European
Union, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 93, 115 (2008) (“Tax incentive competition is at best a zero-sum
game; it merely moves economic activity from one state to another with no net gain on either
the national or local level.”).
63. Later in this Subpart we will introduce a complication into the fact pattern by
hypothesizing an additional MNE competing for the investment opportunity. See infra notes
66–68 and accompanying text.
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negative 60, that is, it would rationally be willing to exempt MNE1 from tax and
provide incentives of up to 60.
Country C is a developed economy that does not particularly need the
manufacturing plant and looks with disfavor on the potential overburdening of its
infrastructure. Its indifference point is net tax of positive 45, that is, were MNE1 to
pay tax of any less than 45, the result would be a net reduction in the welfare level
of Country C’s residents. MNE1 estimates its pretax profit from investing in Country
C to be 170.
Which investment would constitute the most efficient use of resources?
Investing in Country A would increase global welfare by 120 (Country A would
be better off by 80 and MNE1 would be better off by 40). Investing in Country B
would increase global welfare by 200 (Country B would be better off by 60 and
MNE1 would be better off by 140). Investing in Country C would increase global
welfare by 125 (Country C would be worse off by 45 and MNE1 would be better
off by 170):
Table 1. MNE1 investment’s effect on global welfare

(Cost)/benefit to host country
Pretax benefit to MNE1
Total

Country A

Country B

Country C

80
40
120

60
140
200

(45)
170
125

To one who has access to all of the pertinent information, it is clear that the most
efficient use of resources would be for MNE1 to invest in Country B. The practical
question is how to achieve this result.
One way would be to establish a benevolent international regulatory agency
with access to all of the necessary information and with broad power to direct
investments. It would compile the data listed above and direct MNE1 to invest in
Country B. I hope the reader did not take this suggestion seriously. Aside for the
doubts that we might entertain regarding the bona fides of such an agency and our
reticence to entrust it with that kind of power, such an agency would, as Hayek
observed with regard to central planning boards, simply be incapable of collecting
all of the relevant data.64 The decision-making process must be decentralized, and
the key to such a decentralized process is the signaling provided by tax
competition.
In our example, Country A could signal its desire for the investment by agreeing
to exempt MNE1 from tax and providing it with incentives of slightly less than 80.
Any more than that and hosting the investment would no longer be worthwhile.
Country C could signal its position by agreeing to impose tax slightly in excess of
45. From the perspective of MNE1, its after-tax, after-incentive profit from the
investment would be no more than 120 in Country A and no more than 125 in
Country C.
Similarly, Country B could signal its desire for the investment by agreeing to
exempt MNE1 from tax and offering incentives (i.e., imposing a negative net tax)

64. Hayek, supra note 50, at 519–20, 530; Hayek, supra note 51, at 136–41.
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of slightly less than 60. In such a case, MNE1 would invest in Country B and earn
close to 200. As we have seen, this is the most efficient use of resources and
confirms that free tax competition would encourage an efficient investment
pattern.
Having confirmed that the investment in Country B is the most efficient use of
resources, we now turn to the distributional question of identifying who, under a
regime of free tax competition, will benefit from the additional efficiency. We saw
that Country B’s indifference point is net tax of negative 60. Were it in fact to impose
net tax of this amount, MNE1 would capture the entire benefit of the additional
efficiency. However, as the site of the most efficient investment, Country B could
offer quite a bit less, capture a greater share of the efficiency savings, and still outbid
its competitors.
The maximum net tax that Country B could charge and still outbid its
competitors is a function of the net advantage MNE1 would secure by investing in
that country. Recall that (a) net advantage is benefits minus costs and (b) costs
include opportunity costs, that is, the profits the MNE could earn with the best
alternative course of action. We know that MNE1 estimates its pretax profits from
investing in Country B to be 140. The best alternative course of action is investing
in Country C and earning 125.65 In other words, by investing in Country B, MNE
incurs an opportunity cost of 125. From its perspective, the net advantage that it
will secure by investing in Country B, prior to the imposition of tax by that country,
is 15. Consequently, Country B could outbid each of its competitors for the
investment as long as it was willing to impose a tax on MNE1 of less than 15,
leaving MNE1 with an after-tax profit of at least 125. As neither of its competitors
could offer a more attractive deal, Country B would succeed in enticing MNE1 to
construct the factory in its territory and would increase the welfare of its residents
by 75, equal to the sum of the spillover effect (60) and the net tax it expects to
collect (15).
It is worth noting that even if the pretax profits that MNE1 expected to earn from
investing in Country B were only 100, Country B would still be able to outbid its
competitors by agreeing to impose net tax of negative 25, that is, by exempting
MNE1 from taxation and offering incentives worth just over 25. Here, too, the
after-tax profit of just over 125 is more than any other country can offer. The only
difference is that Country B’s national welfare would increase by just under 35 (the
spillover effect of 60 minus the incentive of just over 25). However, the increase in
global welfare of 160 is still greater than could be achieved by MNE1 investing either
in Country A or in Country C.
A reasonable objection to this analysis is that MNE1 might not be willing to
allow the host country to benefit from the entire efficiency gain. True, the net
positive tax of just under 15 in the first scenario and the net negative tax of just
over 25 in the second scenario will enable MNE1 to profit more by investing in
Country B than anywhere else. Nevertheless, MNE1 might engage in a game of

65. Note that when considering opportunity cost, the cost of not undertaking an alternative
investment is the after-tax (or after-incentive) anticipated profit from that investment. See
generally EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & JOEL F. HOUSTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 542 (concise 2d ed.1999).
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economic chicken by threatening to invest in Country C even at a lower expected
profitability, unless Country B allows it to retain a larger portion of the efficiency
bonus.66 The problem here is that the simplified fact pattern containing three
countries and only one MNE effectively gives the MNE monopoly power, which
it can exploit to dictate terms. Introducing competition on the demand side also
will largely alleviate this issue.67
Assume that MNE2 is interested in pursuing a similar investment opportunity
and that it expects to earn 45, 135, and 165 in Countries A, B, and C respectively
for the sake of simplicity we will assume that each country can support only one
investment or that the marginal advantage of a second investment is significantly
lower than the first:
Table 2. MNE2 investment’s effect on global welfare

(Cost)/benefit to host country
Pretax benefit to MNE2
Total

Country A

Country B

Country C

80
45
125

60
135
195

(45)
165
120

Before the introduction of MNE2, the lack of competition meant that the
distribution of the efficiency gain was unclear and that the actual tax imposable
by Country B would be somewhere between negative 60 (in which case MNE1
would capture the entire efficiency gain) and 15 (in which case County B would
capture the entire efficiency gain). Now, however, MNE2 will be willing to pay
tax of up to 10 in order to invest in Country B.68 Consequently, in order to outbid
MNE2, MNE1 will need to offer to pay tax of between 10 and 15. Of course, here
too MNE1 and Country B might play a game of economic chicken, each
threatening to adopt suboptimal behavior in order to secure a better deal for itself.
However, due to the forces of competition, the zone of possible agreement69 is
much smaller and Country B will be able to capture the lion’s share of the
efficiency bonus.70

66. In terms of negotiation theory, the range between Country B’s indifference point
and the maximum tax it could impose while still outbidding Country C is the zone of
possible agreement (ZOPA). Any arrangement that falls within the ZOPA will improve the
welfare of both participants relative to their best alternative to negotiated agreement
(BATNA), but by threatening to resort to its BATNA each party will attempt to induce the
other to allow it to retain a greater share of the ZOPA. See generally DEEPAK MALHOTRA &
MAX H. BAZERMAN, NEGOTIATION GENIUS 20–24 (2007).
67. International cooperation may be necessary to ensure an effective competitive
environment. See infra notes 109–114 and accompanying text.
68. MNE2’s best alternative is investing in Country A, where it could earn no more
than 125 (Country A would not rationally be willing to provide incentives of greater
than 80). As it expects to earn 135 in Country B, MNE2 could afford to pay tax of up
to 10.
69. See generally supra note 66.
70. MNE2 will be relegated to its next best alternative, in this case Country A. To prove
that MNE1 investing in Country B and MNE2 investing in Country A will maximize global
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Summing up our discussion so far, a regime of free tax competition in which all
parties seek to promote their own self-determined self-interest will result in the
efficient exploitation of economic resources and a maximization of global welfare.
In distributing the efficiency benefits, the country that is home to the most efficient
investment opportunity will capture at least some of the benefit of the efficiency
differential between it and the MNE’s most profitable alternative venue.
E. Tax Competition Leads to Inefficiency?
Recent literature seems to accept almost as a truism that tax competition results
in an inefficient allocation of economic resources.71 The idea is that tax competition
artificially distorts behavior and that maximizing global welfare requires that
investments flow to where they would have gone in the absence of such competition.

welfare, the following chart compares the total contribution to global welfare of the possible
alternative investment patterns:
MNE1
Country A

Country
A

MNE2

Country B
Country A
Country B
MNE1
MNE2
Total

—

Country
B

Country A
Country B
MNE1
MNE2
Total

80
60
40
135
315

Country
C

Country A
Country C
MNE1
MNE2
Total

80
(45)
40
165
240

Country C
80
60
140
45
325

—

Country B
Country C
MNE1
MNE2
Total

60
(45)
140
165
320

Country A
Country C
MNE1
MNE2
Total

80
(45)
170
45
250

Country B
Country C
MNE1
MNE2
Total

60
(45)
170
135
320

—

71. E.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 569 (5th ed. 1989); SHAVIRO, supra note 16, at 114; Avi-Yonah, supra note 16,

at 1578; William B. Barker, Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition:
Overcoming the Contradictions, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 161, 175 (2002); Fleming et al.,
supra note 46, at 12–13 & n.43; Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 285 (2001);
Keinan, supra note 8, at 34–35; Avi Nov, The “Bidding War” To Attract Foreign Direct
Investment: The Need for a Global Solution, 25 VA. TAX REV. 835, 844 (2006); Oleksandr
Pastukhov, International Taxation of Income Derived from Electronic Commerce: Current
Problems and Possible Solutions, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 310, 325–26 (2006); Rosenzweig,
Tax Havens?, supra note 1, at 931, 946–47; Fadi Shaheen, International Tax Neutrality:
Revisited, 64 TAX L. REV. 131, 133 (2011); Joel Slemrod & Reuven Avi-Yonah, (How) Should
Trade Agreements Deal with Income Tax Issues?, 55 TAX L. REV. 533, 554 (2002).
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The argument usually proceeds as follows: Assume that an MNE can invest in
Hightaxland and earn a 15% pretax return on its investment, while by investing in
Lowtaxland it can earn only a 12% pretax return. Clearly, so goes the argument, the
investment in Hightaxland is a more efficient use of the MNE’s resources. However,
now assume that the corporate tax rate in Hightaxland is 30%, while the corporate
tax rate in Lowtaxland is only 5%. The MNE’s after-tax return from investing in
Hightaxland will be 10.5%, while its after-tax return from investing in Lowtaxland
will be 11.4%. Consequently, it will invest in Lowtaxland even though such an
investment is, from the perspective of global welfare, inefficient. To prevent such a
misallocation of resources, commentators propose coordinated efforts to combat tax
competition and promote what is commonly referred to as “capital export
neutrality.”72 Proposals range from (a) convincing countries that refraining from tax
competition is in their own interest,73 to (b) inducing countries to avoid harmful tax
competition by promise of reward or threat of sanction,74 to (c) encouraging
countries to tax their corporations’ foreign-source income via effective
controlled-foreign-corporation regimes so that whatever the corporation saves by
investing in a low-tax country will increase its tax liability to its home country.75

72. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
73. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1658.
74. Dean, supra note 60, at 132–33; Kudrle & Eden, supra note 1, at 46–47; Rosenzweig,
Tax Havens?, supra note 1, at 933. See also OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note
1, at 57–58 (recommending that countries that have close legal, economic, or political ties with
havens use those ties to reduce harmful tax competition).
75. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 40–43. For example, assume
that USCorp expects a 10% pretax return from investing in Country X (corporate income tax
30%) and an 8% pretax return from investing in Country Y (corporate income tax 5%).
Although the pretax expected return in Country X is higher, the after-tax in Country Y is higher
(7.6% versus 7%). Under the presumption of this analysis—a presumption that the text will
challenge—the tax rate differential will induce a misallocation of resources: USCorp will
invest in Country Y even though the investment in Country X is more efficient. One way to
negate the effects of the tax differential is for USCorp’s country of residence to impose tax on
all of USCorp’s income from wherever derived and to credit any foreign taxes paid. Assume
that USCorp is subject to tax at the rate of 35% in its country of residence. Were it to invest in
Country X and earn $100,000, it would pay tax of $30,000 to Country X and an additional
$5,000 ($35,000 minus a foreign tax credit of $30,000) to its country of residence, leaving it
with after-tax profit of $65,000. Were it to invest in Country Y and earn $80,000, it would pay
tax of $4,000 to Country Y and an additional $24,000 ($28,000 minus a foreign tax credit of
$4,000) to its country of residence, leaving it with after-tax profit of $52,000. High
resident-country tax coupled with the foreign tax credit produces capital export neutrality. The
reason that the OECD emphasized the controlled-foreign-corporation regime is that in our
scenario, USCorp could avoid home-country tax by establishing a subsidiary in Country Y. A
controlled-foreign-corporation regime requires USCorp to pay tax, not only on its own
income, but also on the income of any foreign corporations that it controls, such as YSub.
The U.S. rules for taxation of income derived from controlled foreign corporations appear
in I.R.C. §§ 951–965 (2012) (“Subpart F”). The main weakness of the U.S. regime is that with
respect to MNEs, it only applies to passive income. In our example, assuming that YSub is
engaged in real business activity in Country Y, Subpart F would not apply. The United States
would tax YSub’s profits only upon its repatriation or deemed repatriation.
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The problem with this argument is its presumption that investing at the maximum
pretax rate of return necessarily produces an efficient distribution. Under the
Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency,76 Distribution D1 is more efficient than
Distribution D2 if and only if it is possible, using Distribution D1 as a starting point,
to redistribute wealth and arrive at Distribution D3, in which no individual is worse
off and at least one individual is better off than they would have been in Distribution
D2. Distribution D1 is efficient (in the absolute sense) if and only if there is no
achievable Distribution D2 such that Distribution D2 is more efficient than
Distribution D1.77
All else being equal, higher expected rates of return will reflect a more efficient
use of resources. In other words, beginning with the distribution of resources
following an investment at a higher rate of return, it will be possible to redistribute
wealth so that no one is worse off and at least one person is better off relative to what
their economic situation would have been following an investment at a lower rate of
return. However, in order to constitute an effective indication of efficiency, the rates
of return must reflect the preferences of all those who are likely to be affected by the
investment, including residents of the host country. As the potential impact of the
investment upon the residents’ welfare is substantial, direct, and immediate, no
reasonable measure of efficiency can afford to ignore their preferences. Furthermore,
as the primary means at their disposal for signaling their preferences is the package
of tax and incentives that they offer investors, it is not the pretax return but rather the
after-tax return that is the more accurate measure of efficiency.78

76. J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal Comparisons of Utility, 49
ECON. J. 549 (1939).
77. To demonstrate, assume that the maximum amount that X would pay for an item is
$100 and the maximum amount that Y would pay is $70. Y’s possession of the item
(Distribution D1) is less efficient than X’s possession of the item (Distribution D2), because
from Distribution D2 we can transfer $90 in cash from X to Y and create a situation
(Distribution D3) in which both X and Y are better off than they were in Distribution D1 and
nobody is worse off.
The Kaldor-Hicks definition differs from the earlier definition proposed by Vilfredo Pareto.
Under the Pareto definition, Distribution D1 is more efficient than Distribution D2 if and only
if no individual in Distribution D1 is worse and at least one individual is better off than in
Distribution D2. Distribution D1 is Pareto-efficient (in the absolute sense) if there exists no
Distribution D2 such that Distribution D2 is more efficient than Distribution D1. T.W.
HUTCHISON, A REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DOCTRINES 1870–1929, at 225 (1953) (translating
VILFREDO PARETO, MANUEL D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE app. at 617–18 (1909)). In the example
above, the relative Pareto efficiency of Distribution D1 and Distribution D2 would be
undetermined as Y would prefer Distribution D1 and X would prefer Distribution D2. Because
of the limited applicability of the Pareto definition, economists tend to prefer the Kaldor-Hicks
definition. For critique of the Kaldor-Hicks definition as a criterion for determining economic
policy, see AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33 n.4 (1987). See also Ronald M.
Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 191, 197–201 (1980).
78. Arguing that global welfare would be improved by neutralizing the effect of tax
differentials is similar to an argument that global or national welfare would be improved by
neutralizing the effect of rent differentials. The fact that, ignoring rent differentials, building
a factory in Manhattan is more profitable than building one in Duluth, does not mean that the
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Investing at a higher pretax rate of return might or might not constitute an efficient
use of resources. To make such a determination, we would need to know not only
the MNE’s pretax rate of return, but also the effect of the investment on the welfare
of the residents of each of the countries. If Lowtaxland is desperately in need of the
investment for purposes of employment or development, while from the perspective
of Hightaxland the investment would contribute little to its economy or perhaps even
constitute a net drain on its resources, investment in Lowtaxland may indeed
maximize global welfare. In our previous example, absent tax considerations, MNE1
would have invested in Country C (which promised a pretax return of 170 versus a
pretax return of 140 in Country B) even though the investment in Country B was a
more efficient use of resources. The only practical way for Hightaxland and
Lowtaxland to signal their attitudes toward the investment is by means of the taxes
they propose to impose on the MNE. That Lowtaxland is willing to impose a lower
rate of tax indicates that it values the investment much more than does Hightaxland.
The fact that the MNE’s decision where to invest given the tax differential was
different from what its decision would have been absent the tax differential, a fact
pattern considered a smoking gun in much of the literature, is hardly an indictment
of tax competition as a means of promoting efficiency. To the contrary, signals are
only valuable to the extent that they are capable of changing behavior.79 In ordinary
circumstances, reduced supply or increased demand causes prices to rise. From an
efficiency perspective, the advantage of the price rise is precisely that it curtails use
of the commodity. In Hayekian terms, the price rise signals that the marginal use of
the commodity is more valuable than it was previously and encourages consumers
and firms to adapt their behavior accordingly.80 Lowtaxland’s higher after-tax rate of
return indicates that, weighing the preferences of all those who are likely to be
affected by the investment, the investment in Lowtaxland is probably a more efficient
use of global resources.81
In a recently published book, Daniel Shaviro takes issue with a prevalent theme
in the academic discourse: that the goal of the U.S. international tax regime should
be the maximization of global welfare.82 His position is that the primary focus of the
U.S. tax regime should be the welfare of U.S. citizens and residents.83 In particular,

former option is a more efficient use of the nation’s resources. The higher rent in Manhattan
is a signal conveyed by the market that others value the use of that land more than they do the
use of land in Duluth. Consequently, if the convenience of locating the factory in Manhattan
versus locating it in Duluth does not justify the extra rent, this is a strong indication that
locating the factory in Manhattan is not an efficient use of that particular piece of land.
79. Margalioth, supra note 5, at 182 (“[T]ax incentives are meant to distort behavior.”).
80. Hayek, supra note 50, at 524–25.
81. As with any other supplier of goods, services, and opportunities, Hightaxland may
simply refuse to compete against Lowtaxland. Its reasons are its own. Perhaps it feels that such
competition is beneath its dignity. Perhaps it has determined that by refraining from competing
in this particular case and retaining its high tax structure it will secure more tax revenue and a
higher standard of living for its residents. In any case, the after-tax return of investment in
Hightaxland will reflect this preference not to compete, just as after-tax return of investment
in Lowtaxland will reflect that country’s willingness to compete for the resources that it
expects will improve the lives of citizens and residents.
82. SHAVIRO, supra note 16.
83. Id. at 108–09.
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he claims that the foreign tax credit, which unilaterally, although subject to numerous
restrictions, grants U.S. taxpayers a dollar-for-dollar credit for foreign taxes paid, is
overly generous.84 The literature tends to justify the foreign tax credit as necessary
in order to achieve allocative efficiency by neutralizing the effect of disparate foreign
income rates.85 Shaviro argues that while the credit promotes global welfare, it does
so at the expense of the U.S. treasury and U.S. interests.86 Consequently, if the United
States does permit a foreign tax credit, it should only do so on the basis of reciprocity:
a quid pro quo to those countries that are willing to commit to grant their own
taxpayers a dollar-for-dollar credit for taxes paid to the United States.87
Of course, Shaviro’s view that the U.S. international tax regime focus on
promoting U.S. interests as opposed to amorphous global interests is not a case of
U.S. exceptionalism. By implication, other countries are also justified in seeking to
advance their own interests in the field of international taxation.88 Should every
country act in such a manner, the picture that emerges might appear to be one of a
dog-eat-dog world in which global welfare is the victim of individual countries’
egocentric pursuit of their own self-interest: a Hobbesian free-for-all that stands in
direct conflict with the idealized world of multilateral cooperation for the benefit of
all. 89
However, our analysis has shown that not only is selfish behavior on the part of
individual countries not an impediment to the promotion of global welfare, it is in
practice a precondition of global welfare maximization. Only when countries signal
their preferences via the package of taxes and incentives that they offer can the
market accurately determine which investment is likely to result in the most efficient
use of resources. Paradoxically, the harmonization of tax rates and other aspects of
domestic tax regimes with the goal of improving global welfare by directing
investments to their most efficient uses will tend to produce the opposite result.90

84. Id. at 110.
85. Id. at 109.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 110.
88. If anything, because the United States often serves as a role model for other countries
when they design their international tax regime, there is a case for the United States to adopt
a more global perspective in the anticipation that others will follow suit. Id. at 112.
Nevertheless, Shaviro argues that because “the United States . . . is no longer in a position to
dictate rules that others will generally follow,” it is justified in pursuing its own self-interest
in the field of international taxation. Id. Other countries, whose international influence is less,
would certainly be justified in so doing.
89. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 178 (The Floating Press 2009) (1651) (characterizing
the state of nature as “Warre of Every One Against Every One”).
90. Particularly apt is Adam Smith’s observation in this regard:
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his
capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its
produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to
render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed,
neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is
promoting it. . . . By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never
known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is
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Of course, one could argue that while tax competition may encourage the efficient
use of resources, the resulting distribution is not necessarily equitable and that
limiting competition is necessary to achieve distributional justice. However, this is a
different issue, one that will be addressed in Part III. At present, I am simply
attempting to refute the argument that tax differentials create inefficiencies by
diverting investment away from those countries in which they would have been made
in the absence of those differentials.
F. Comparison with the Tiebout Model
The proposal presented in this Article bears a superficial resemblance to Charles
Tiebout’s model of local taxation.91 Musgrave and Samuelson had previously
claimed that the absence of a market mechanism precludes the possibility of
achieving an optimal level of expenditure for public goods.92 Tiebout argued that
while their analysis was valid for federal expenditures, it did not necessarily apply to
expenditures by local government.93 He envisioned a state of affairs in which a large
number of local communities would offer varying packages of public services and
individuals would “vote with their feet”94 by choosing to live in the community
whose local government best satisfied their set of preferences.95

an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words
need be employed in dissuading them from it.
ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 351–52 (Charles J. Bullock ed., Cosimo Classics 2007) (1776).
91. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
92. Richard Abel Musgrave, The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy, 53 Q.J.
ECON. 213, 219–20 (1939); Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of
Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350, 355 (1955); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure
Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 388 (1954).
93. See Tiebout, supra note 91, at 418 (stating that federal spending exclusive of defense
amounted to $15 billion, while local expenditures amounted to $17 billion). Tiebout did not
state explicitly whether “local expenditures” includes expenditures by states. The rationale of
his article would seem to require their inclusion, as states as well as municipalities can compete
for residents. According to U.S. government figures, the numbers for 2015 are $2.9 trillion for
non-defense federal expenditures, $1.6 trillion for state expenditures, and $1.8 trillion for local
expenditures. Federal 2015 Government Spending, USGOVERNMENTSPENDING.COM,
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/fed_spending_2015USrn [https://perma.cc/BXN7
-Z7UX]; State Guesstimated 2015 Government Spending, USGOVERNMENTSPENDING.COM,
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/state_spending_2015USrn [https://perma.cc/DD5M
-3WHC]; Local Guesstimated 2015 Government Spending, USGOVERNMENTSPENDING.COM,
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/local_spending_2015USrn [https://perma.cc/2SRY
-9MV9] (the latter two being “guesstimated”).
94. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY 43 (2011).
95. In producing his model, Tiebout made a number of explicit assumptions: (1)
consumer-voters are fully mobile, (2) consumer voters have full knowledge of different
revenue and expenditure patterns and respond to those differences, (3) there are a large number
of communities, (4) there are no restrictions due to employment, (5) there are no externalities
between communities, (6) there exists an optimal city size, and (7) that communities seek to
attain that optimal size. Tiebout, supra note 91, at 419. Tiebout’s proposal has generated a
large literature that is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss. However, I will note that one
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The Tiebout model and this Article share a number of common features. Each
proceeds from the proposition that an efficient allocation of resources requires
knowledge of preferences regarding the use of those resources and that the market is
an indispensable tool in disclosing those preferences. Each then uses tax competition
as a means of revealing preferences and inducing behavior that advances allocative
efficiency. However, despite these common features, the models are fundamentally
distinct, and it would be inaccurate to describe this Article’s proposals as an
application of the Tiebout model in the international arena.
A strict application of the Tiebout model internationally would have national
governments offering prospective residents varying levels and types of services at
varying rates of tax and would have individuals choosing their ideal mix of services
and tax. Such an application of the model is unrealistic. Tiebout explicitly assumed
that individuals are easily able to move from one jurisdiction to another in response
to the package of taxes and public goods offered in each jurisdiction.96 This
assumption, of doubtful validity even on the domestic front, is in almost all cases
inapplicable to the international arena.97 Consequently, the strict application of the
Tiebout model internationally is unlikely to prove effective as a means of producing
an optimal level of public services. An international application of the Tiebout model
that is both more reasonable and more relevant to our purposes would have national
governments offering prospective investors varying levels and types of services at
varying rates of tax and would have MNEs choosing their ideal mix of services and
tax. Countries whose packages of tax and services would not attract a sufficient level
of investment would be forced to modify the packages that they offer. As individuals
in the classic Tiebout model reveal their preferences for public goods by where they
choose to live, MNEs in the international Tiebout model would reveal their
preferences with regard to public goods via their choice of where to invest. In both
instances, the goal of the competitive structure is to induce the taxing authority to
provide an optimal level of public services.
However, the analogy between competition for residents and competition for
investments is problematic. The Tiebout model relies upon the hypothesis that all
those who consume and pay for public goods provided by a particular jurisdiction
have expressed and continue to express their preference for the package offered by
that jurisdiction.98 For the analogy between competition for residents and
competition for investments to hold, investors would need to be the only consumers

of the primary questions that arises under the Tiebout model is whether it allows for
redistribution via the local tax system. See, e.g., GILLETTE, supra note 94, at 43–44 (arguing
that redistributive programs may promote efficiency-enhancing benefits associated with the
Tiebout model); David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1684 n.37 (2013)
(“[I]n a Tiebout world . . . redistribution is, by assumption, impossible.”).
96. Tiebout, supra note 91, at 419.
97. But see Avi-Yonah, supra note 19 (arguing that for upper-middle and high income
taxpayers, expatriation is not significantly more difficult than moving capital abroad).
98. Tiebout, supra note 91, at 420 (“The act of moving or failing to move is crucial.
Moving or failing to move replaces the usual market test of willingness to buy a good and
reveals the consumer-voter’s demand for public goods. Thus each locality has a revenue and
expenditure pattern that reflects the desires of its residents.”).
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of services provided by the host government. Rarely, if ever, is this the case.99 The
consumers of public goods include both local residents and foreign investors.100 The
fact that investors prefer a particular package of public goods does not necessarily
mean that that package is optimal after taking into consideration the preferences of
local residents, who likely constitute the largest number of consumers of those
services.
As opposed to the Tiebout model, this Article is not concerned with determining
the optimal level of expenditure on public goods. Rather, it is concerned with the
means of drawing investments to their most efficient venues. Indicative of this
distinction is the fact that while both models rely on the signaling of preferences to
achieve economic efficiency, the identity of the preference signaler is different.
Under the Tiebout model, taxpayers signal their preferences by their choice of
residence, and the taxing authorities respond to those signals by providing differing
packages of public goods.101 The sole interest of the taxing authority is to attract and
retain an ideal number of residents.102 If preferences change and individuals desire
more public services, community governments will respond by raising taxes and
providing more services.103 If preferences change and individuals desire fewer public
services, community governments will lower taxes and provide fewer services.104
The community government’s inherent indifference to the tax burden that it imposes
and the services it provides is a function of the underlying goal of the Tiebout model:
establishing a market mechanism by which to optimize the provision of public
goods.105
Under the model proposed in this Article, the taxing authority is far from
indifferent to the tax burden that it imposes on MNEs. From its perspective, the
higher the tax burden that it can successfully impose, the better; the only restraint is
its legitimate concern that too high a tax burden will drive investors to alternative
venues. As opposed to the Tiebout model, in which taxpayers signal their preferences
and the taxing authority simply responds to those signals,106 here the (positive or
negative) tax burden that the taxing authority imposes on MNEs signals its desire or
its reticence to host certain types of investments and the extent of that desire or

99. One example in which this condition might hold would be a special economic zone
isolated from the rest of the country so that public goods provided in the zone would not affect
the rest of the country and public goods provided in the rest of the country would not affect
those operating in the zone.
100. Even in the case of special economic zones, one may assume a certain degree of
leakage of public goods from one sector to the other. For example, defense expenditures will
benefit those on both sides of the line demarcating the border of the special economic zone,
social expenditures will likely benefit investors in the zone who hire employees living outside
the zone, and services provided to investors in the zone will likely benefit their employees
who live outside the zone.
101. See Tiebout, supra note 91, at 419–20.
102. Id. at 419 (“[C]ommunities below the optimum size seek to attract new residents to
lower average costs. Those above optimum size do just the opposite. Those at an optimum try
to keep their populations constant.”).
103. See id. at 422.
104. See id. at 422.
105. Id. at 419–20.
106. Id.

2016]

TAX COMPETITION

933

reticence. The goal of the competitive regime is to induce MNEs to factor into their
decision-making processes the benefits and costs of alternative investment venues
from the perspective of residents of the host country and to choose the venue that
maximizes global welfare.
Another expression of the difference between the two models is their underlying
assumptions regarding similarities and differences among competing jurisdictions.
Tiebout did not explicitly state whether he assumed that local communities are equal
in all respects except for the level and type of public goods that they offered, and
indeed his model works well either way.107 In fact, the simplest case in which to
apply his theory would be one in which local communities compete for residents
under conditions of equality and craft their public expenditure budget purely in
response to individuals’ preferences. This Article, by contrast, necessarily assumes
that countries are dissimilar and that the (positive or negative) taxes that they impose
on MNEs quantify and signal the relevant aspects of local circumstances. Were all
countries equal with regard to the cost and benefits of hosting MNE investment, tax
competition would have no role to play in achieving allocative efficiency:
investments would simply flow to those venues in which the pretax return was the
highest. It is only because of the differences in local circumstances that the most
efficient investment may be in a venue other than the one that offers the highest
pretax return.
G. Objections
The case for tax competition as a means of maximizing global welfare is open to
several possible objections. One is that the analysis presented above is of an idealized
picture of free competition that does not necessarily correspond to reality, in which
market failure is prevalent. Prominent categories of market failure could include an
insufficient number of international actors,108 externalities such as the environmental
consequences of economic activity, and the agency issues that arise when
governments prefer their own interests to those of the people they ostensibly serve.109
It is undeniable that tax competition would be more successful in promoting
global welfare in the absence of market failure. However, the choice is not between
an ideal world and a nonideal world, but rather among the options available in the
nonideal world in which we live. The environment in which international tax
competition operates is analogous to the environment in which domestic commercial

107. One of his examples involves a community with a 600-yard beach, presumably a
competitive advantage over other communities without such a facility; however, he only
discusses this asset of the community with reference to the optimal size of the population. Id.
at 419, 421.
108. It is interesting to note that although there are a limited number of actors, the forces
seem to be fairly evenly balanced. According to UNESCO, fifty-one of the largest one hundred
economies are MNEs and forty-nine are countries. Corporate Power Facts and Stats,
UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/education/tlsf/mods/theme_c/popups/mod18t04s01.html
[https://perma.cc/6AYB-TPQH] (citing MANFRED STEGER, GLOBALISATION: A VERY SHORT
INTRODUCTION 51 (2d ed. 2008)).
109. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1613–16; Margalioth, supra note 5, at 188; Roin,
Taxation Without Coordination, supra note 1, at S79–S86.
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competition operates. Monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels inhibit free competition;
the noninternalization of externalities can induce socially inefficient behavior; the
interests of corporate management do not necessarily align with those of
shareholders and other corporate stakeholders; and, due to fraud, ignorance, or
cognitive imperfection, market actors, whether individuals or corporations, often act
in ways that are detrimental to their own welfare. On the domestic front, both theory
and practice have shown that the proper regulatory function of the government is to
promote free and fair competition and, where the market cannot operate successfully,
to attempt via its own efforts to replicate the results of an ideal market.110 Examples
of regulations that promote free and fair competition include antitrust law, carbon
taxes, subsidies for education, civil and criminal sanctions for breach of fiduciary
duties, and consumer protection. Examples of replicating the results of an ideal
market include public services and social insurance.
Combating market failure in the field of tax competition is more difficult than in
the field of domestic commercial competition. Perhaps the most important reason is
that, whereas on the domestic front the government can act as a neutral observer and
regulator of the market, on the international front the entities that must make and
enforce the regulations are themselves competitors.111 Nevertheless, transnational
efforts to combat market failure have been, and others could be, undertaken. An
example of efforts that have been undertaken is the attempt to reach international
agreement on the emission of greenhouse gases. Although disagreement regarding
distributional issues, particularly among countries with economies at differing stages
of development, has hitherto dominated the discourse,112 from an economic

110. See generally David Elkins, Taxation and the Terms of Justice, 41 U. TOL. L. REV.
73, 78–82 (2009) (explaining that the function of commutative taxation is to overcome market
failure by providing funding for public services, internalizing externalities, and overcoming
cognitive imperfection).
111. See Diane Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax
Sovereignty in Shaping Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 555, 573–75 (2009).
112. See, ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE (2010); Brooke
Ackerly & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change Justice: The Challenge for Global
Governance, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 553 (2008); Paul Baer, Who Should Pay for
Climate Change? “Not Me,” 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 507 (2013); Daniel A. Farber, The Case for
Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a Complex World, 2008 UTAH
L. REV. 377; Yoram Margalioth, Analysis of the US Case in Climate Change Negotiations, 13
CHI. J. INT’L L. 489 (2013); Yoram Margalioth, Assessing Moral Claims in International
Climate Change Negotiations, 3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 43 (2012); Yoram
Margalioth & Yinon Rudich, Close Examination of the Principle of Global Per-Capita
Allocation of the Earth’s Ability to Absorb Greenhouse Gas, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
191 (2013); Martha C. Nussbaum, Climate Change: Why Theories of Justice Matter, 13 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 469 (2013); R.T. Pierrehumbert, Cumulative Carbon and Just Allocation of the
Global Carbon Commons, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 527 (2013); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein,
Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565 (2008); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should
Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51 (2009);
Noah M. Sachs, Climate Change Triage, 44 ENVTL. L. 993 (2014); Amy Sinden, Allocating
the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus Justice, 85 WASH. L. REV. 293 (2010); Tom
E.R.B. West, Environmental Justice and International Climate Change Legislation: A
Cosmopolitan Perspective, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 129 (2012); Daniel A Farber,
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perspective a successful agreement would be one that compels countries to
internalize the environmental cost of activity occurring within their territory.113
Countries would then need to consider those costs when constructing the package of
taxes and incentives that they offer to potential investors. As an example of efforts
that could be undertaken, consider the field of antitrust laws. Recent years have seen
an increase in international cooperation in this field.114 It is worth investigating
whether the goals of antitrust regulation could include effective tax competition, in
addition to traditional goals such as lowering consumer prices, expanding consumer
choice, and protecting small businesses.115 For instance, a determination that a
proposed merger would make it more difficult for potential host countries to capture
a reasonable share of the efficiency bonus could weigh against approval of the
merger. In a similar vein, perhaps regulatory authorities could sanction MNEs where
evidence exists that they explicitly or implicitly agreed not to compete for investment
opportunities.
Analysis of these issues is well beyond the scope of our current discussion. What
this Article does suggest is that instead of curbing tax competition, transnational
organization and structures should focus on reducing instances of market failure and
thereby promoting effective tax competition.
Some commentators claim that tax incentives are unnecessary to attract beneficial
investment. Their argument is that MNEs ordinarily weigh nontax factors more
heavily than they do tax factors,116 and in those relatively rare instances in which tax
breaks do tip the balance, the investment will be at best marginally beneficial from
the perspective of the host country.117 Whether or not this claim is empirically

Climate Justice, 110 MICH. L. REV. 985 (2012) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID
WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE (2010)); Rachel Ward Saltzman, Note, Distributing
Emissions Rights in the Global Order: The Case for Equal Per Capita Allocation, 13 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 281 (2010); Matthew Schuman, Note, Can Global Warming Laws
Redistribute Wealth?, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 463 (2009).
113. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate
Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28
STAN. ENVTL, L.J. 3, 44–45 (2009) (arguing that a carbon tax forces polluters to internalize the
negative externality they impose on others); Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design
of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 500–01 (2009) (asserting that a carbon tax
internalizes externalities associated with anthropogenic climate change); Nicholas Stern, The
Economics of Climate Change, 98 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 1, 24–26 (2008),
available at pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.98.2.1 [https://perma.cc/7SEF-L6N8].
114. BARRY J. RODGER & ANGUS MACCULLOCH, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE EC
AND UK 386–88 (4th ed. 2009).
115. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 31–45 (2005); RENATO NAZZINI,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LAW 11–50 (2011).
116. See Owens, supra note 46, at 189.
117. See William B. Barker, An International Tax System for Emerging Economies, Tax
Sparing, and Development: It Is All About Source!, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 349, 363–65 (2007);
Yoseph M. Edrey, Taxation and the Encouragement of Financial, Social, and Human Capital
Investments, 40 HEB. U. L. REV. 437, 488–89 (2011); Avi Nov, Tax Incentives to Entice
Foreign Direct Investment: Should There Be a Distinction Between Developed Countries and
Developing Countries?, 23 VA. TAX REV. 685, 691 (2004); Andrew P. Kummer, Note,
Pro-Business but Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of its Tax Regime Is

936

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:905

accurate,118 it does not constitute an objection to the arguments raised in this Part. If,
due to nontax factors, a country can successfully compete for investment while
imposing a high corporate tax, it will not need to offer tax incentives to potential
investors, even without international cooperation to curtail tax competition. To the
contrary, improving the competitive climate by addressing sources of market failure
would likely improve that country’s competitive position. This is not to say that
countries necessarily gauge accurately either the cost and benefits of foreign
investments or the tax and incentive program necessary to attract them. Empirical
studies are invaluable, both from the perspective of the individual country attempting
to maximize its own welfare and from the perspective of global welfare, and efforts
by international organizations and the academic community to promote
welfare-maximizing tax policies are to be applauded.119 However, despite the
occasional rhetoric to the contrary, the fact that tax rates may be lower than necessary
to attract beneficial investment is not an indictment, but rather an exoneration of tax
competition.
Another oft-raised objection to tax competition is that unbridled competition
among countries for MNE investment has reduced—or will soon reduce—effective
corporate tax rates to zero. This “race to the bottom,” so it is claimed, prevents the
host country from receiving just compensation for the services that it provides and
threatens its capacity to provide for the welfare of its residents.120

Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 284 (2014).
118. For views that the claim is inaccurate, see, for example, Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at
1644–46 (asserting that tax incentives are essential to attract investments, citing the cases of
Ireland, Costa Rica, Israel, Malaysia, and Singapore); Roin, Competition and Evasion, supra
note 1, at 552–53; and Joshua D. Moore, Comment, The Economic Importance of Tax
Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: An Analysis of International Corporate Tax
Harmonization Proposals and Lessons from the Winning Corporate Tax Strategy in Ireland,
20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 345 (2007). Many commentators have noted
that any country attempting to tax the interest income of foreign residents would impair its
own and its corporations’ ability to borrow funds. See sources cited supra note 27.
119. See, e.g., G.A. MACKENZIE, DAVID W.H. ORSMOND & PHILIP R. GERSON, INT’L
MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 149, THE COMPOSITION OF FISCAL ADJUSTMENT
AND GROWTH: LESSONS FROM FISCAL REFORMS IN EIGHT ECONOMIES (1997); ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD TAX POLICY STUDIES NO. 16, FUNDAMENTAL REFORM OF
CORPORATE INCOME TAX (2007); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD TAX
POLICY STUDIES NO. 17, TAX EFFECTS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: RECENT EVIDENCE
AND POLICY ANALYSIS (2007); Sara Dillon, Anglo-Saxon/Celtic/Global: The Tax-Driven Tale
of Ireland in the European Union, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 1 (2010); Moore, supra
note 118.
120. Muhammod Shaheen Chowdhury, Income Tax Compliance and Policy Issues in
Developing and Emerging Economies: The Case of Bangladesh, 20 NEW ZEALAND J. OF TAX’N
L. & POL’Y 277, 294 (2014) (“The desire to attract foreign investment has caused harmful tax
competition (race to the bottom) among neighbouring states by offering tax incentives and
concessions.”); Noam Noked, Integrated Tax Policy Approach to Designing Research &
Development Tax Benefits, 34 VA. TAX REV. 109, 142 (2014) (“Members who offer greater
tax benefits to R&D than is optimal are engaged in a sort of ‘race to the bottom’ that hurts
their own interests.”).
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As a preliminary matter, the concept of “race to the bottom” is a misnomer, if only
because it postulates the existence of a “bottom.” We have seen that “zero” is not a
singularity that one can approach but never reach or that one can reach but never
pass; rather, it is an arbitrary point on a line stretching to infinite positive tax in one
direction and to infinite negative tax in the other.121 In fact, tax competition could,
and often does, push effective tax burdens into negative territory as countries offer
MNEs inducements in the form of direct grants or subsidies in amounts that are
greater than the tax, if any, that they collect.122
Consequently, the phrase “race to the bottom,” if taken literally, would indicate a
state of affairs in which tax burdens approach negative infinity. Not only is such a
state of affairs impossible, but the fact that no country has any economic incentive
to reduce its tax burden below what was described earlier as its indifference point
creates, in practice, a floor below which taxes will not fall (whether this floor is above
zero or below zero will vary from case to case). A more reasonable understanding of
the term “race to the bottom” is that tax burdens will tend to approach countries’
indifference points. This reading is also not entirely accurate. We have seen that
countries will be able to capture a portion of the efficiency bonus flowing from
investment in their territory and that the portion they are able to capture will increase
dramatically when MNEs compete among themselves for investment
opportunities.123 Nonetheless, it is true that tax burdens in an environment of free tax
competition will likely be lower than they would have been in the absence of such
competition.124
The fairness objection actually involves two distinct issues that the literature tends
to confuse. The first is that the “race to the bottom” violates basic tenets of
transactional justice: although host countries provide essential services upon which
MNEs rely and which contribute to the creation of their profits, tax competition
prevents the host country from meaningfully participating in those profits. The
second is that, even though tax competition may provide for an efficient (in the
classic Kaldor-Hicks sense of the term) allocation of global resources, the results are
not necessarily fair from the perspective of distributive justice. Unchecked, the
market tends to concentrate economic power, exacerbate economic inequality, and
leave many without sufficient resources.
The next two Parts of the Article will consider these objections. Part II will discuss
the transactional justice objection. Part III will discuss the distributive justice
objection.

121. See supra Part I.B.
122. See Margalioth, supra note 5, at 187 (arguing that “[t]argeted tax incentives are much
more powerful and cost effective policy tools than low across-the-board corporate income tax
rates,” but noting that “[t]he disadvantage of targeting is that policymakers often cannot
estimate which types of investments have the greatest positive spillover effects”); Noked,
supra note 120, at 153–54 (discussing government subsidies to encourage investment).
123. See supra Part I.D.
124. This state of affairs is hardly surprising. Prices tend to be lower when suppliers
compete than when one supplier has a monopoly.
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II. TRANSACTIONAL JUSTICE
A. Free Rider
This Part will consider the argument that by receiving services supplied by the
government of the host country, the MNE incurs a moral obligation to pay for those
services via taxation. In the absence of effective corporate taxation, the MNE is a
“free rider,” benefiting from services paid for by others.125
A close examination of this claim shows that it is actually several arguments
wrapped into one:
a.

Host countries provide services.

b.

MNEs operating in the host country use those services.

c.

Tax competition prevents the host country from imposing effective corporate
tax on the MNE.

d.

In the absence of effective corporate taxation, the MNE does not pay for the
services it receives.

e.

If an MNE benefits from services supplied by the host country without paying
full value for them, the result is a violation of transactional justice.

The first and second arguments are uncontroversial. In addition to services that
require budgetary outlay—security, infrastructure, education, and so forth—the host
country provides a service simply by permitting the MNE to operate in its sovereign
territory, something it is not required to do under customary international law.126 The
third argument is also uncontroversial if it means that host countries cannot
successfully impose as high a tax burden as they would have been able in the absence
of competition. However, the first three arguments are insufficient to ground a claim
of transactional injustice. To ground such a claim it would be necessary also to prove
the fourth and fifth arguments. This Part will closely examine these two arguments.
B. Factor Prices
The argument that tax competition violates transactional justice by enabling
MNEs to benefit from services provided by the host country without paying for them
ignores the fact that MNEs pay for many of those services indirectly when they
purchase factors of production. In most cases, requiring them to pay directly via
taxation would be double charging for the same service.127

125. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1627.
126. As opposed to customary international law, binational and multinational agreements
often require a country to permit foreigners to compete on equal footing, for example, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
127. Even Avi-Yonah would appear to accept this argument. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at
1627 (“If a multinational invests in a country with a small public sector, it will probably have
to incur more costs or earn lower profits than if the public sector were larger. For example, it
may have to invest in training for its workers because the government provides inadequate
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For example, assume that a country has a highly skilled workforce and that those
skills are the result of superior education in publicly financed schools. By hiring
those employees, the MNE is indirectly benefiting from the host country’s education
expenditures. However, in a competitive environment, more skilled and
better-educated employees will command higher salaries. In other words, the MNE
will indirectly bear the cost of its employees’ education via the salaries it pays them.
From the perspective of benefit theory, it would probably be accurate to describe the
employees as (via their taxes) buying education from the government, using that
education to improve their marketable skills, and then selling more valuable and
consequently more expensive services to the MNE.
Note that from the perspective of the MNE, the source of funding for the
institutions that educated their employees is irrelevant. The skills of its employees
are what concern the MNE, not whether the institutions that trained them received
their funding from the government, from international aid, from donations, or from
tuition. Clearly, a private professional school has no claim under transactional justice
to receive payment from clients of its alumni. Similarly, the host country has no claim
under transactional justice to compensation for the expenses it incurred in educating
the MNE’s future employee.
The same reasoning applies to the rent or purchase of property. In a country with
a well-developed economic infrastructure, a stable social structure, and effective civil
and criminal law enforcement, the cost of renting or purchasing property will be
higher than in a country with a primitive economic infrastructure, in a country facing
civil unrest, or in a country where law enforcement is sporadic or capricious. In a
country with a relatively wealthy population, retail property will be more valuable
than in countries with a poor population. In other words, to the extent that
government services create an environment conducive to profitable business
operations, the MNE will indirectly pay for those services. Furthermore, and similar
to what we noted with regard to employee education, whether the business
environment is due to direct government spending or whether it is due to other factors
such as cultural norms or the country’s geopolitical situation is likely not of particular
concern to the MNE. In a competitive environment, it will pay the market price for
use of property. The government does not ordinarily have a claim under transactional
justice against the MNE.
Empirical evidence tends to support the normative argument. Analysis of tax
incidence indicates that the economic burden of taxes imposed by host countries on
MNEs is largely borne, not by shareholders, but by labor and land.128 Stated
differently, the more that an MNE pays the host country, the less it will pay
employees and the less it will pay landowners. The causal connection between the
two is that the higher the corporate tax, the less attractive the country will be to MNEs
and the less demand there will be for local labor and land. Lower demand for labor

public education, or it may have to build its own transportation systems because the
government does not supply adequate infrastructure. In that case, it would be inappropriate to
penalize the multinational by taxing it at a higher rate—such as its home-country rate—to
offset the lower taxes levied by the host country.”).
128. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 380 (stating that the standard economic advice to
small open economies is to refrain from taxing foreign investment because the tax will
necessarily be shifted to labor and land).
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and land will drive down wages and rents.129 These economics are a manifestation of
the idea that when the MNE does not pay the government for the services it provides,
it will pay those who directly benefit from those services—workers and
landowners—the full market value of the services that they, in turn, provide.
Conversely, requiring the MNE to participate in the expense of training its employees
and of providing a convivial atmosphere in which to conduct business via a direct
tax will cause a reduction in the salaries and the rent that it pays. In other words, in
a perfectly competitive environment, the MNE will pay once, and only once, for the
services that it receives.
C. Use and Economic Benefit
It is possible that, in certain circumstances, factor prices will not reflect the full
value of government services. In such cases, one might argue that tax competition
and the “race to the bottom” precipitate transactional injustice by effectively
preventing host countries from imposing taxes on MNEs operating in their territories.
The response to this argument is twofold. First, we have seen that in a competitive
environment, the tax that a country is able to charge MNEs reflects the relative
advantages of investment in that country.130 The more that the host country has to
offer and the lower the factor prices, the more advantageous the investment will be
from the perspective of the MNE and the more tax it will be willing to pay. In other
words, if a country is not able to impose taxes on MNEs, this would seem to indicate
that factor prices already reflect all of the advantages of operating in that country’s
territory. Where they do not, the country should be able to impose a positive net
corporate tax and still compete successfully for MNE investment.
Second, the fact that an MNE uses government services does not necessarily mean
that it economically benefits from those services, and, without economic benefit,
mere use cannot substantiate a claim under transactional justice. As a simplistic
example of the difference between use and economic benefit, assume that, in an effort
to reduce unemployment, the government provides all businesses with publicly
financed valet parking services. Although the MNE has no independent interest in
the valet services, it agrees to accept them, either because it is required to do so under
law or simply as a goodwill gesture toward the local community. In other words,
although the MNE uses the valet services, it does not economically benefit from
them. It would be hard to justify a claim that transactional justice requires the MNE
to pay for the services it admittedly uses but from which it neither benefits nor
expects to benefit.
Substantiating a claim for host-country taxation of MNEs under transactional
justice would require a demonstration that MNEs economically benefit from services
by the host country. However, providing such a demonstration may be more difficult
than appears at first glance.

129. See Roin, Competition and Evasion, supra note 1, at 553 (“This decrease in wages
may be just as painful (economically) to the workers in such jurisdictions as would a tax
increase necessitated by a decrease in corporate income taxes.”).
130. See supra Part I.B–D.
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In general terms, we can define “benefits economically” as follows: X benefits
economically from Y if and only if X is better off economically with Y than without
Y. If X does benefit economically from Y, then the benefit is equal to the difference
between X’s economic situation with Y and X’s economic situation without Y.
Consequently, in determining whether and to what extent an MNE benefits
economically from services provided by the host country, the baseline is what the
MNE’s economic situation would have been in the absence of those services.
Many commentators seem to equate an MNE receiving services from the host
country to the MNE economically benefiting from the services that it receives from
the host country.131 This view is inaccurate. It implicitly assumes that in the absence
of services provided by the host country, the MNE would operate in a Hobbesian
state of nature. The more realistic description is that in the absence of services
provided by the host country, the MNE would simply invest elsewhere.
As we have seen, the ex ante economic benefit that an MNE derives from services
provided by the host country is the difference between the present value of the profit
it expects to earn by investing in that country and the present value of the profit it
expects to earn by investing in the best alternative venue.132 Even though the host
country provides extensive services to the MNE—including permitting the MNE to
operate within its sovereign territory—the pretax economic benefit that the MNE
derives from availing itself of those services might be small, zero, or even negative,
depending upon the alternative investment venues available. If the economic benefit
is negative, the host country will likely need to provide incentives—impose a
negative tax—if it is to induce the MNE to invest in its territory. If the economic
benefit is positive, it should be able to impose taxes that will capture some or all of
that benefit.
The claim that tax competition produces transactional injustice by preventing host
countries from imposing taxes on MNEs that benefit from those services and
permitting MNEs a free ride at the expense of actual taxpayers is unsustainable. To
demonstrate how the issues discussed in this Subpart play out in practice, let us again
consider the issue of publicly funded education. It is widely accepted that such
education provides substantial positive externalities by improving the quality of
debate on public issues, reducing crime, creating economic ripple effects that allow
all members of society to demand and receive higher wages, and reducing economic
inequality by, to some extent, leveling the competitive playing field for the next
generation. It is therefore reasonable for members of a society to agree that taxes
should fund or subsidize education.133 The question is the extent to which the
externalities of publicly funded education benefit MNEs and the effect of such
externalities on the factor prices and taxes an MNE will pay in a competitive tax

131. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction To Tax Income and Consumption in the New
Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GEO. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003); Stephen
E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, “What’s Source Got To Do with It?”
Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 90–95 (2002); Robert A.
Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 18, 29 (1993) (discussing this view).
132. See supra Part I.C–F.
133. Of course, reasonable minds may differ regarding the extent or manner of funding or
subsidizing education.
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environment. If operating in a relatively highly educated society is advantageous to
an MNE, it will likely pay higher wages and higher rent. To the extent that factor
prices do not capture the entire benefit, the host country should be able to impose an
effective tax burden. If the host country cannot do so—in other words, if imposing
tax on a MNE would cause it to invest elsewhere—this would constitute strong
evidence that, although operating in a country that provides public education, the
MNE is not benefiting from the externalities of that education or, more likely, that
the benefits are already subsumed in factor prices.
III. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
A. Introduction
A further indictment of tax competition and the consequent “race to the bottom”
is that it supposedly impedes efforts to achieve distributive justice. The literature
raises this claim in two separate contexts. The first is internal: the effect of tax
competition on the ability of countries to supply social services.134 The second is
external: the effect of tax competition on the distribution of wealth among nations.135
Although the literature does not always sufficiently distinguish between these two
contexts, they are conceptually distinct.
Subpart B will discuss domestic distributive justice. It will distinguish between
social insurance and social assistance and will demonstrate that in neither instance is
it reasonable to require foreign investors to participate in the provision of those
services, beyond paying the market price for the services they receive (including the
tax that it would pay the home country in a competitive tax environment). It will
further argue that prohibitions against ring fencing would tend to curtail social
services programs by making it difficult for countries with extensive social service
programs to compete for foreign investment.
Subpart C will discuss international redistribution. While alleviating global
poverty is a pressing international concern, this Subpart will argue that attempting to
use the international tax regime to redistribute wealth is based on a false analogy
between the role of taxation in the domestic arena and its role in the international
arena. As demonstrated by Kaplow and Shavell, income tax is a more effective and
a more efficient method of redistributing wealth than is regulation. However, their
analysis is pertinent only to the domestic arena. In the international arena, limiting
tax competition is comparable to regulation, and using regulation to redistribute is
the very antithesis of their theorem.

134. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1632–39; Ruth Mason, Made in America for
European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1277, 1294 (2008).
135. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1639–43; Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 374 (“[T]ax
competition among developing countries . . . costs them significant revenues, and benefits
rich-country interests . . . .”); Barker, supra note 117, at 354 (“The present system . . . may be
characterized as foreign aid to developed economies since the developing economies are
subsidizing the activities of MNEs . . . .”); Benshalom, How to Redistribute?, supra note 1;
Ilan Benshalom, The New Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice Implications for International
Trade and Tax Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2010); OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 8.
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B. Domestic Distributive Justice
In the broadest sense of the term, welfare services include what one commentator
described as “social insurance and social assistance.”136 The former is a service that an
ideal market would be able to provide. It is only because of market failure—moral
hazard, cognitive imperfection, information imbalance, externalities, and so forth—that
the state finds it necessary to provide the service.137 Social insurance is not
redistributive to the extent that the present value of future expected benefits,
considering both the odds of the qualifying event occurring and the time value of
money, equals the premium that the state charges.138 Social assistance, on the other
hand, involves a redistribution of wealth with the goal of providing basic goods and
services to those who would not otherwise be able to afford them or, more generally,
of mitigating economic inequality.139 The difference between them is that while
either might disturb the ex post market distribution, only social assistance disturbs
the ex ante market distribution.
As a factual matter, it is likely true that tax competition makes it more difficult
for countries to finance their welfare programs. We have already noted that
competition tends to drive down prices whether the market is for widgets or for
investment opportunities, and that the countries cannot effectively impose the same
level of taxes on MNEs as they would have been able to impose in the absence of tax
competition. Nevertheless, the appropriate questions are not factual but normative.140
1. Social Assistance
With regard to social assistance, the question we need to ask is whether an MNE
that purchases goods and services at market prices from individuals, firms, and the
government of the host country—including the right to operate within its sovereign
territory—has a further moral obligation to provide for the welfare of individuals
with no connection to its business activity, simply because they are residents of the
country in which it operates. It is important to isolate the issue at hand. The question
is not whether relatively wealthy firms and individuals—represented here by the
MNE and its shareholders—have a general obligation to contribute to international
redistributive efforts. Subpart C will consider this issue. Nor is the question whether
the MNE has an obligation to compensate residents of the host country who are
adversely affected by the activities of the MNE. Compensating such residents is not
an issue of distributive but of compensatory justice. In any case, a rational host
country will consider these effects when determining its indifference point and will
not permit the MNE to operate in its territory unless the taxes that it expects to collect
compensate it sufficiently. Simply phrased, the question is whether the simple fact

136. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1636.
137. Id. at 1637.
138. See Elkins, supra note 110, at 83–84.
139. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1636.
140. See Roin, Competition and Evasion, supra note 1, at 553 (“Advocates of tax
harmonization appear to regard any departure from the level and distribution of the tax burden
set in the noncompetitive world as unduly low.”).
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that a person resides in a country in which an MNE conducts business operations is
sufficient to ground a claim under distributive justice.
Because we are at present considering the effect of tax competition not on
international redistribution as such, but rather on domestic redistribution in the host
country, we should, systematically, begin by examining the normative basis of
domestic redistribution. This would allow us to determine who is subject to the
obligations of domestic redistribution and, specifically, whether it is reasonable to
include foreign investors.
The problem one confronts when attempting to address this issue is that social
philosophers have not yet proposed a satisfactory line of reasoning that would justify
both redistributing resources for the purpose of mitigating economic inequality and
limiting that redistribution to the confines of a single country. For example, while
Rawls’s argument that individuals do not morally deserve their social position or
their natural talents can justify redistribution,141 his use of this argument to justify
domestic redistribution is problematic. Individuals do not morally deserve their place
of birth or the citizenship of their parents any more than they do their social position
or their natural talents.142 Under Rawls’s own terms of reference, permitting factors
that are arbitrary from a moral point of view to have such a profound impact upon
one’s life chances is unjust.143
Rawls himself relied on the idea that distributive justice is the fair distribution of
the benefits of social cooperation and is therefore inapplicable outside the framework
of such cooperation.144 The question of whether it is possible normatively to justify
domestic redistribution and how one might go about doing so is far beyond the scope
of this Article.145 However, I believe that we can list certain characteristics of social
cooperation that could serve to justify domestic redistribution.

141. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15, 73–74, 102 (1971).
142. Loren Lomasky, Toward a Liberal Theory of Natural Boundaries, in BOUNDARIES
AND JUSTICE 55, 56–60 (David Miller & Sohail H. Hashmi eds., 2001).
143. See, e.g., BRIAN BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF THE PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES IN A THEORY OF JUSTICE BY JOHN RAWLS 128–30 (1973);
CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 139–41, 143–53
(1979); Lomasky, supra note 142, at 60; THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 250–51
(1989); KOK-CHOR TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM, AND
PATRIOTISM 60 (2004) (“A Rawlsian approach to global justice . . . would apply the difference
principle to the global basic structure as a whole . . . .”); cf. Will Kymlicka, Territorial
Boundaries, in BOUNDARIES AND JUSTICE, supra note 142, at 249–75 (explaining that a nation
has a legitimate right, within limits, to encourage its national character and may, for instance,
restrict but not eliminate immigration. However, a country does not have the right to reserve
the use of its resources for the exclusive use of its inhabitants.).
144. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 113–20 (1999); See John Rawls, Distributive
Justice, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY: THIRD SERIES 58, 58 (Peter Laslett & W.G.
Runciman eds., 1967).
145. For arguments defending domestic redistribution, see, for example, RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 195–215 (1986); WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR:
NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND CITIZENSHIP 225 (2001); AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE
ETHICS OF MEMORY 74–76 (2002); DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 84–85 (1995);
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 191 (1989); YAEL TAMIR,
LIBERAL NATIONALISM 117–21 (1993); Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33
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Residents of a country share, and presumably view themselves as sharing, a
long-term common fate. Both their own and their progeny’s quality of life are largely
dependent upon the social, political, and cultural institutions that they create and
maintain. Significantly, the economic terms of engagement among members of the
society do not always reflect the costs and benefits of those institutions. Whether or
not such sentiments have any normative basis, people seem to care more about
misfortune befalling other members of their society than they do about misfortune
befalling those they perceive as outsiders. Finally, members of a society expect that
should they or those that they care for find themselves in need, other members of
their society will provide them with assistance commensurate with community
standards.
None of these considerations justifies the inclusion of MNEs within the
community of the host country for the purpose of distributive justice. An MNE’s
involvement in the life of the host country is strictly economic. It invests when it
finds it economically beneficial to invest, and it divests when it finds it economically
beneficial to divest. From the MNE’s perspective, a country’s social, political, and
cultural institutions are factors that help determine whether it is willing to invest in
that country and how much it is willing to pay in order to do so.146
Adopting Rawlsian terminology, we can say that, against a background of fair
institutions, the distribution resulting from economic cooperation—the terms of
which satisfy the criteria of transactional justice—will necessarily be fair.147 Within
a society, distributive justice is an element of that institutional framework.148 It
allocates the costs and benefits of the social cooperation that serves as background
for transactional justice.149 For an MNE, on the other hand, the institutional
framework is a bargained-for advantage. In other words, the market price that it pays
for goods and services within the country along with the market price that it pays for
the right to operate in the country and benefit from services provided by the host
government will reflect the home country’s institutional framework.150
Furthermore, the MNE is not a member of the body politic that decides the terms
of distributive justice. It does not have a vote in determining the contours of the
redistribution.151 Perhaps more significantly, those who do participate in the
decision-making process presumably do not consider the desires or the needs of the

PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (2005); Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the
Unencumbered Self, in COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM 12, 20–24 (Shlomo
Avineri & Avner de-Shalit eds., 1992).
146. See supra Part I.B.
147. See RAWLS, supra note 141, at 54–60.
148. Id. at 274–84.
149. Id. at 4.
150. With regard to the costs and benefits of the international institutional framework, see
infra part III.C.
151. ECON & FIN. COMM’N, supra note 10, at 4044 (“A survey of the whole field of recent
taxation shows how completely the Governments are dominated by the desire to tax the
foreigner.”); Shay et al., supra note 131, at 89 (2002). One of the better-known adages of tax
politics is attributed to Senator Russell B. Long: “Don’t tax you. Don’t tax me. Tax that fellow
behind the tree.” ROBERT MANN, LEGACY TO POWER: SENATOR RUSSELL LONG OF LOUISIANA
333 (1992). Foreigners are behind that proverbial tree.
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MNE or its shareholders except to the extent that such desires or needs are expected
to affect their own economic prospects. Note also that the criteria for receiving social
assistance and the extent of that assistance vary from country to country. It is not
clear why residents of countries that provide relatively generous social assistance
have a greater claim under distributive justice against MNEs operating in their midst
than do residents of countries that provide less generous social assistance.152 In any
case, it is reasonable to assume that the terms of redistribution are such that neither
the MNE nor its shareholders are entitled to benefit from social assistance should
they encounter misfortune or find themselves in need.
2. Social Insurance
With regard to social insurance, the host country’s claim on MNEs to participate
in the costs of such programs—beyond paying full value, as determined under
competitive market conditions, for the benefits of operating in the country—is, if
anything, weaker than it is with regard to social assistance. It is the wealthier
countries that tend to supply their residents with social insurance.153 By definition,
social insurance does not seek to redistribute ex ante wealth but rather to overcome
market failure. Under ideal market conditions, individuals would save for retirement
and would purchase insurance policies from private firms, protecting themselves and
their dependents against the risk of unemployment, disability, or death. However, it
is likely that an actual market would produce an insufficient and inefficient level of
insurance coverage and savings. People tend to underestimate the risk of misfortune
(cognitive imperfection).154 Insurance companies are incapable of verifying all of the
risk factors, meaning that those who purchase insurance will tend to be those who
carry greater than average risk (adverse selection).155 Those who do purchase

152. In certain instances, MNEs benefit from social assistance provided by the host
country. For example, social services may prevent civil unrest or provide a more educated and
dedicated workforce. However, in those cases, the issues that we are discussing in this Part do
not arise, as either the MNE will pay for those services indirectly via increased factor prices
or the host country will be able to charge the MNE a tax that reflects the benefits it receives.
See supra Part II. Competition among countries for investments would not only permit—but
indeed would require—the provision of those services. The claim in the text is that MNEs
have no obligation to contribute to the social assistance programs in the countries in which
they invest beyond paying, directly or indirectly, the fair market value of the services they
receive. With regard to general obligations of international distributive justice, see infra
Part III.C.
153. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1640.
154. See ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 10–14, 146–63
(1988); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 211, 213 (1995); Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking:
An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices,
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 338–42 (1986).
155. Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 946 (1988); Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental
and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 8–9 (2006); Peter Siegelman,
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
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insurance are less likely to avoid protected risks (moral hazard).156 The guarantee of
social assistance in case of need constitutes a disincentive to the purchase of
insurance protection (externalization of costs).157 Because of these market failures,
the state will often force individuals to purchase insurance and to save for
retirement.158 While it cannot hope to emulate exactly the insurance coverage and
savings rate that would prevail in an ideal market, it hopes that what it does achieve
under social insurance is closer to the ideal than what would prevail under nonideal
market conditions absent social insurance.
The argument for curtailing tax competition because it lowers tax revenues to the
point that host countries cannot adequately finance their social insurance programs
is effectively an argument that host countries should adopt more extensive social
insurance programs than its residents are willing to pay for. If the cost of providing
insurance benefits is more than the premiums collected, the obvious options are
reducing benefits and increasing premiums.159 It is hard to imagine that a country is
entitled to demand that foreigners subsidize its social insurance program. Of course,
a country may legitimately charge competitive market rates for access to investment
opportunities in its sovereign territory and may then distribute the revenue among its
population in the form of cash or additional services, including increased insurance
benefits. What proponents of curtailing tax competition have failed to do is explain
why a country has the right to demand that MNEs subsidize its social insurance
program in an amount that exceeds the tax that it can successfully charge in a
competitive environment.
3. Ring Fencing
Several prominent tax scholars, along with international agencies such as the
OECD and the European Community, have singled out the phenomenon of ring
fencing as particularly noxious.160 The idea is that countries have the right to decide
for themselves how much social assistance and how much social insurance they wish
to provide. The international community should not, therefore, stipulate minimum or
maximum levels of tax. However, the argument goes, once a country determines the
level of tax it wishes to impose, it should not be permitted to charge foreign investors
less than what it charges its own residents. Doing so constitutes harmful tax
competition and justifies the adoption of countermeasures by the international
community to combat such abuse.

156. TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 6–7 (3d ed. 2013);
Abraham, supra note 155, at 946; Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse
Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 373 (2003) (defining moral hazard as
the “change in incentives that can result from insurance protection”).
157. Elkins, supra note 110, at 89–90.
158. See David Autor, Mark Duggan & Jonathan Gruber, Moral Hazard and Claims
Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance, 6 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 110 (2014).
159. See Mitchell B. Weiss, International Tax Competition: An Efficient or Inefficient
Phenomenon?, 16 AKRON TAX J. 99, 130 (2001) (“Rather than adapting their tax systems
to this New World, [OECD countries] are attempting to adapt this New World to their tax
systems.”).
160. See sources cited supra note 5.
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It is not clear why ring fencing is a negative phenomenon. The choice of how
much social insurance and how much social assistance to provide is a domestic
matter, involving at a deep level what the society in question considers to be the
mutual rights and obligations inherent in, or constitutive of, a national community.
A prohibition against ring fencing would effectively discriminate against countries
with extensive social service programs, as they would find it difficult to compete
against other countries with less extensive social service programs and lower tax
rates.
Furthermore, and contrary to the intentions of those who advocate such a rule, the
likely result of prohibiting ring fencing would not be higher tax rates on MNEs but
rather lower tax rates across the board.161 In other words, instead of increasing the
revenue available for social programs, it would actually decrease those revenues.
Ireland is a paradigmatic case in point. Prior to 1997, Ireland, in an effort to attract
foreign investment, imposed a lower rate of tax on foreign corporations than it did
on domestic corporations. In 1998, following the adoption of the EU Code of
Conduct that prohibited measures providing for “significantly lower effective level
of taxation, including zero taxation, than those levels which generally apply in the
Member State in question,”162 Ireland replaced its multi-rate structure with a single
low tax rate applicable to all corporations, foreign and domestic.163 Other countries
were thus no better off than they had been when competing against Ireland for MNE
investment, and Ireland’s tax structure became considerably less progressive. Why
this shift was a positive phenomenon from the perspective of those who advocate for
redistributive tax structures is something that the opponents of ring fencing have yet
to explain.
In general, countries should be free to determine the level of social services—whether
insurance or assistance—that they wish to provide without fearing that too high a
level will impede their ability to attract foreign investment. The argument that
countries need to choose between extensive social services and foreign investment is
unpersuasive.
C. International Redistribution
Opponents of tax competition have contended that limiting tax competition would
result in a fairer distribution of global wealth, as it would stimulate a flow of revenue

161. See, e.g., OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 17 (“[T]he ‘race to the bottom’
nowadays often takes less the form of traditional ring-fencing and more the form of across the
board corporate reductions on particular types of income . . . .”); Rosenzweig, Tax Havens?,
supra note 1, at 966–67; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1646 (illustrating the
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate low tax regimes by comparing Ireland offering
foreign investors a preferential tax regime and Ireland lowering its generally applicable tax
rates).
162. Conclusions of the Ecofin Council Meeting, supra note 1, at 3.
163. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1654; Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud,
Technological Innovation, International Competition, and the Challenges of International
Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 379 (2013).
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from wealthy MNEs to the governments of poor host countries.164 The present
Subpart will examine that contention.
Alleviating global poverty is one of the more pressing and under-addressed issues
in the field of international affairs. However, international redistribution is an
extraordinarily broad subject and involves normative and practical issues that are far
beyond the scope of this Article. The present Subpart will focus upon one particular
aspect of that topic and will argue that limiting tax competition would be ineffective
and inefficient as a means of redistributing wealth. It will begin by describing the
assumptions underlying the contention that tax competition inhibits international
redistribution and will then critically examine those assumptions. The Subpart will
conclude by discussing the applicability of Kaplow and Shavell’s view of taxation
and regulation to the international front and will argue that, far from supporting the
use of the international tax regime as a means of redistributing wealth, their analysis
argues strongly against it.
1. Tax Competition as an Impediment to International Redistribution
The claim that tax competition impedes efforts at international redistribution rests
upon a number of tacit factual assumptions. The first is that host countries are
generally poor.165 The second is that limiting tax competition will benefit host
countries by enabling them to impose greater tax burdens on MNEs operating in their
territories. The third is that increasing the tax coffers of developing countries is an
effective means of combating poverty.
With regard to the first assumption, while it is true that some host countries are
poor, identifying host countries as poor is both overinclusive and underinclusive. It
is overinclusive because host countries are often relatively wealthy, as evidenced by
the well-publicized competition between Israel and Ireland for Intel investment,166
by the establishment of Patent Box regimes by prominent European countries,167 and
by the abolishment of withholding tax on portfolio interest by the United States.168 It
is underinclusive because many poor countries are unattractive investment venues,
with or without tax incentives.169 Enabling host countries to impose a higher tax
burden than a competitive market for investment would allow seems a rather
haphazard means of mitigating global inequality and alleviating international
poverty.

164. See sources cited supra, note 135.
165. Benshalom, How to Redistribute?, supra note 1 at 330–36.
166. Intel in Israel: A Fab Relationship Faces Criticism, WHARTON SCH. U. OF PA.:
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Sept. 29, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/intel
-israel-old-relationship-faces-new-criticism/ [https://perma.cc/5G47-XQV8] (“Israel has to
compete with other countries every few years to be the site of the next new and upgraded plant.
In 2012, Ireland won the race to host Intel’s next generation 14-nanometer chip plant because
the company deemed Israel’s offer of 1 billion shekels in aid as insufficient.”).
167. See sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text.
168. See sources cited supra note 26.
169. Tracy A. Kaye, Taxation and Development Incentives in the United States, 62 AM. J.
COMP. L. SUPP. 617, 626 (2014).
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The problem with the second assumption is that, given the advantages inherent
in conducting operations in countries with developed economies, tax incentives may
be necessary to allow poor countries to compete with wealthy countries for
investments. 170 Prohibiting them from engaging in tax competition would most
likely result in a decrease in both their tax revenues and their share of international
investment. In fact, many commentators have argued that the true purpose of limiting
tax competition is to protect the tax base of wealthy countries against encroachment
by poor countries (and that the term “base erosion” in the OECD’s attempts to
combat “base erosion and profit shifting” refers to the tax base of OECD
countries).171
Regarding the third assumption, it is far from certain that the governments of poor
host countries would use the additional funds to alleviate poverty in their midst.
While there are certainly exceptions across the board, as a rule the governments of
poorer countries tend to be less responsive to the needs of their populations than the
governments of wealthier countries. Much of the additional revenue may find its way
into offshore bank accounts or be used to suppress political opposition. In many
cases, direct assistance to needy individuals—by wealthy countries, by NGOs, or by
individual philanthropists—may be a more effective means of combating poverty
than transferring funds into government coffers. True, some poor countries do have
responsible governments that would use the additional resources wisely, and in such
cases using the government as a conduit of international aid might make sense.
However, proposals to limit tax competition do not make any distinction among
countries based upon the expected use of the additional funds, nor is it likely that
they could make such a distinction.172 Furthermore, we already noted that the
prohibition against ring fencing places countries that actively attempt to combat
poverty through a redistributive tax system at a disadvantage when competing for

170. Margalioth, supra note 5, at 184; Rosenzweig, Tax Havens?, supra note 1, at 932–33.
171. See generally Michael Littlewood, Tax Competition: Harmful to Whom?, 26 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 411, 449 (2004); George M. Melo, Comment, Taxation in the Global Arena:
Preventing the Erosion of National Tax Bases or Impinging on Territorial Sovereignty?, 12
PACE INT’L L. REV. 183, 205 (2000) (“This type of international coercion is perfectly logical
in light of the inequality of power that exists between the OECD members, the most powerful
nations in the world, and the tax havens, which are economically weaker . . . .”); Alexander
Townsend, Jr., Comment, The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation For Economic
Co-operation and Development’s Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 215 (2001). Designing international tax rules that benefit wealthy countries is not a
new phenomenon:
The victors of World War I were the capital exporting nations of the world. Those
countries desired to ensure that the source countries (former colonies) would only
be allocated routine profits and the remainder of profits (the coveted residual
profits) would be allocated to the developed nations of the world where the
capital and know-how were presumed to reside. . . . The early framers knew what
they were doing. They wanted residual profits to be stripped out of source
countries without the need for explanation . . . .
Wells & Lowell, supra note 29, at 776–78.
172. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1641 (“While direct aid can be targeted at those
countries whose governments seem able to use it best, it is doubtful that tax rules can be
targeted in this way.”); see Fleming et al., supra note 14, at 345–46;
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foreign investment.173 In other words, the bulk of the additional tax revenues that
would result from restricting tax competition under current proposals would likely
flow to those countries that do not seek to redistribute wealth internally. Far from
alleviating poverty in the developing world, these proposals could end up
exacerbating global poverty.
Morality and pragmatism both require the international community to devote
more attention and resources than it does at present to the alleviation of poverty, and
particularly extreme poverty, in the developing world. The question of how best to
do so is far beyond the scope of this Article. What this Article has attempted to
demonstrate is that limiting tax competition is not only ineffective as a means of
alleviating poverty in the world’s poorest countries, but is also most likely
counterproductive.
2. The Kaplow-Shavell Model
It is possible that proposals to use the international tax regime as a means of
redistributing wealth rely upon a false analogy between the roles of competition,
regulation, and taxation on the domestic and the international fronts. Under the model
proposed by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, regulation has no role to play with
regard to distributive justice.174 Its sole function is to promote transactional justice
by encouraging competition, preventing fraud, and so forth. Using regulation to
attempt redistribution is both ineffective and inefficient. It is ineffective because the
categories of those who gain or lose under redistributive regulation do not necessarily
coincide with the categories of those from whom a rational redistributive scheme
would want to take and to whom a rational redistributive scheme would want to give.
For example, even if plaintiffs in personal injury cases are usually less well-off
economically than are defendants, a pro-plaintiff rule would ineffectively redistribute
wealth because not all plaintiffs are badly off economically and not all of those who
are badly off economically are plaintiffs.175 It is inefficient because people change
their behavior in response to regulation. For example, a pro-plaintiff rule will result
in individuals and firms devoting more resources to preventing injury to others than
is justified economically.176
True, regulations that conform to the Kaplow-Shavell model may have
distributional side effects, as the poorest and least educated members of society are
often the most vulnerable to fraud and deception, and the wealthiest members of
society are often the primary beneficiaries of curtailed competition. However, it
would not be accurate to describe antifraud and antitrust legislation as redistributive.
It is more accurate to start with a baseline of a world without transactional justice

173. See supra Part III.B.3.
174. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677 (1994); see also David A.
Weisbach, Taxes and Torts in the Redistribution of Income (John M. Olin Program in Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 148, 2002), available at http:// http://www.law.uchicago.edu
/files/files/148.Weisbach-Coase_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4APY-N2AY].
175. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 174, at 674–75.
176. See id. at 669–70, 679–80 (explaining that potential defendants faced with a
pro-plaintiff rule will tend to exercise undue caution).
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and to view antifraud and antitrust legislation as attempts to prevent the unjust
redistribution of wealth from the victims of injustice to its perpetrators. To
demonstrate the difference between regulations that seek transactional justice and
those that seek distributive justice, consider the prohibition against shoplifting on the
one hand and the regulation that retailers clearly explain to customers the terms of
their contract on the other. The former prevents the unjust flow of wealth from
retailers to consumers. The second prevents that unjust flow of wealth from
consumers to retailers. It would not be correct to say that the regulations are operating
at cross-purposes (even if we assume that cancelling both provisions would leave
retailers, as a class, and consumers, as a class, in the same position). The goal of each
is transactional, not distributive, justice.
According to Kaplow and Shavell, the only proper means by which to redistribute
wealth is taxation and, in particular, income taxation.177 Although income taxation
also creates economic inefficiency by disincentivizing productive economic
behavior, they demonstrate that the inefficiencies created by income taxation are less
than those that are created by redistributive regulation.178
At least one commentator explicitly relied upon the Kaplow-Shavell model in
arguing that the international tax regime is an appropriate tool for redistributing
global wealth, 179 and others may have done so implicitly. The problem with this
analogy is that it fails to consider the different roles played by competition, taxes,
and regulation on the domestic and international fronts. On the domestic front, tax is
imposed by a sovereign force operating outside the market, while on the international
front taxation is the subject of competition. To mimic in the international arena the
role played by taxation in the domestic arena, we would need an international
tax-imposing body, a model that almost no one proposes. Instead, the primary
proposals call for countries to coordinate or harmonize their domestic tax policies in
order to limit tax competition.180 Despite their rhetoric, these proposals are the very
antithesis of the Kaplow-Shavell model.
On the domestic front, because tax is imposed by a sovereign force operating
outside the market, neutrality is an important factor in evaluating tax provisions. All
else being equal, taxes that least affect behavior are preferable. On the international
front, in contrast, taxes are among the means by which countries signal their desire
for investment.181 MNEs signal their preferences via their investment decisions,
relying, inter alia, on the tax burdens imposed by the various countries, and, under
Hayekian theory, the purpose of these signals is not only to convey information but
also to induce behavior modification and cause resources to flow to their most

177. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 174, at 669 (“[A]ny regime with an inefficient legal
rule can be replaced by a regime with an efficient legal rule and a modified income tax system
designed so that every person is made better off.”).
178. Id. at 677 (“Redistribution through legal rules causes the same inefficiency as taxes
with regard to the labor-leisure choice . . . . [a]nd when redistribution involves choosing less
efficient legal rules, additional costs are incurred.”).
179. Benshalom, How to Redistribute?, supra note 1, at 327–29; Benshalom, supra note
135, at 3–4.
180. See sources cited supra notes 35–48.
181. See supra Part I.B–D.
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efficient uses.182 Restricting tax competition for the purpose of redistributing wealth
is the conceptual equivalent of using regulation to achieve distributive justice. As
demonstrated by Kaplow and Shavell with regard to regulation on the domestic front
and as demonstrated by our previous discussion with regard to restricting tax
competition on the international front, there is every reason to assume that they will
prove both ineffective and inefficient.
CONCLUSION
The call to limit tax competition in the wake of globalization contains more than
a hint of irony. Perhaps the two most important economic developments of the late
twentieth century were globalization and the demise of the command economy. In
fact, it would not be unreasonable to posit that the two developments were
interrelated: increasing integration of the world’s markets brought to a fore the
difficulties faced by command economies in competing with market economies, and
the collapse of centralized planning permitted increased integration of the world’s
markets.183 As currency controls were lifted, as trade barriers were dismantled, and
as technology improved, capital became more mobile and the competition for
investment, including tax competition, intensified. As anyone who has taken
Economics 101 knows, competition tends to reduce prices. Predictably, therefore,
tax rates have decreased since the late 1980s, particularly with regard to those sources
of income that are the most mobile. In an effort to prevent the diminution of tax
revenues, transnational organizations, along with prominent members of the
academic community, have proposed international cooperation to limit or prevent
tax competition. In other words, while in the late twentieth century globalization
went hand-in-hand with the demise of the command economy, during the early
twenty-first century it has been accompanied by an attempt to introduce an
international command structure into the tax arena by dictating the terms of
agreement between countries and investors.
To achieve allocative efficiency, we must take into consideration the (positive and
negative) effects of investments on the lives of people residing in potential host
countries: a simple comparison of projected pretax returns is insufficient.
Furthermore, the only practical means by which countries can convey information
regarding local conditions and preferences and induce MNEs to factor them into their
decision-making process is via the package of taxes and incentives that they offer
potential investors. Instead of attempting to restrict tax competition, the international
community should work towards creating an environment in which free and fair tax
competition can flourish to the benefit of all.184 Within the framework of a
well-functioning competitive tax structure, the government and the residents of host
countries would receive just compensation for the services that they provide.
With regard to issues of international distributive justice, attempts to restrict tax
competition and, in particular, to prohibit ring fencing would prove not only

182. See supra Part I.A
183. See, e.g., Mark B. Baker, Integration of the Americas: A Latin Renaissance or a
Prescription for Disaster?, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 309, 309 (1997); Melo, supra note
171, at 193.
184. See supra Part I.G.
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ineffective but most likely counterproductive by preventing poor countries from
competing effectively for investment and by inhibiting countries from adopting
redistributive tax systems. Alleviating international poverty is indeed a pressing
international concern. However, on the international front the tax system is both an
ineffective and an inefficient means of achieving this goal.

